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PREFACE 
The Nuclear War Institute held at West Baden College in November, ' 
.... -
1963 indicated rather forcefully that there is little dialogue between philoso-
phers of morality and the men who are engaged i,n the more practical aspects of 
politics. It cannot be said that United States policy has been formulated with-
out ethical considerations I but I believe that most people will admit that these 
considerations have not formally entered into the decisions. The effort to 
relate ethical theory and political reality is a difficult problem inasmuch as it 
involves the confrontation of the theoretical and practical spheres. Yet, there 
are many who hold the importance of such a confrontation and would hope to 
witness solutions that can be worked out in realistic terms. 
Very few philosophers of morality have attempted to relate their ethical 
theories to the concrete hard facts of everyday political life. One notable ex-
ception is Reinhold Niebuhr. His ability in this area has led many to regard 
him as the philosopher of political realism and accounts for his importance as 
an ethician. The extend of his contribution and influence in this area is at-
, 
tested to by a number of men who are professionals in both the ethical and poli-
tical fields. 
This thesis aims primarily at showing how Dr. Niebuhr has gone about 
applying an ethical theory to some aspects of United States foreign policy. 
vi 
\ 
His writings on the subjept cover a large span of years and treat such a variety 
of aspects that any attempt to cover all of them would result in superficial 
treatment. ConsequentlY'4 I have elected to limit the discu15sion to a few speci-
fic issues which were predominant during the time of World War U and the ye!ars 
immediately following. This period has been chosen because Dr. Niebuhr's 
wr:itings at this time reflect his thought in its mC3:turity. Moreover, the issues 
which he discussed at this time are such that we can see rather clearly how he 
went about applying his theory to the practical politics of the time. 
In keeping with the aim of the thesis stated above, it seems best to 
limit this work to the presentation of Niebuhr's doctrine.· An attempt to go 
beyond this into evaluation and comparison would result in overextension and 
superficiality. I say this for two reasons. The first is that Niebuhr's ethics of 
United States foreign policy is found scattered through a number of his books 
and a larger number of occasional writings 0 Even though the bulk of his 
general ethical theory is found well summarized in his books, it at times be-
comes clear only when it is seen how it is applied. As a result it is necessary 
to bring the two aspects together into a synthesis so that the practical decisiom 
can be seen in light of the general theory. Secondly I the dialectical nature of 
his thought demands careful and extensive synthesis. 
Finally I it should be noted that there is no scarcity of secondary 
sources on Niebuhr. Many of them treat of his concern for practical politics. 
vii 
\ 
However, I have not found any extensive treatment of his writings on United 
States foreign policy. The unique character of this thesis I then I is that it 
deals with a limited portion of the practical politics with which he concerned 
himself in order that it might be seen how he applies a general ethics to parl:i-
.--
cular problems. 
.  
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\ 
CHAPTER I 
• 
THE DEVELOPMENT OP NIEBUHR'S SOCIAL ETHICS 
Any attempt to understand an individual's mature philosophical position 
requires at least a general familiarity with the manner in which that position de-
veloped during the course of his philosophical career. Attention must be given 
to those forces which work on the individual from outside such as his education 
and the temper of the age in which he lives 0 We must also consider the de-
velopment in terms of the insights and reactions which take place within the 
individual himself. This is particularly true of a man like Reinhold Niebuhr 
whose interests extend in almost every direction and whose thinking has under-
gone several drastic changes in a relatively brief span of time. It is precisely 
because of this variety of interests and the radical changes in his thinking that 
the task of providing an account of background and development becomes a 
difficult one. Nevertheless, various patterns and trends can be detected al-
though the divisions and changes were never as clear-cut and abrupt as a 
summary analysis might lead one to believe. 
The evolution of Niebuhr's social ethics and political philosophy is 
generally considered to have occurred in three major phases. The first, which 
corresponds approximately to the period of the 1920's, is characterized by a 
1 
\ 
2 
conventual liberalism which combines the doctrines of the Social Gospel with 
, ~ I 
the pragmatism of John Dewey. This trend had wide popular acceptance in the 
• 
United States at the time. During the period of the 1930' s, the second phase in 
the development of Niebuhr's thought was to appear in the form of the acceptana:: 
, .. -
of Marxist principles, although not without qualification. By approximately 
1940, his mature position was beginning to take form and it is generally believec 
that from this time up to the present, his position has not changed essentially 
even though there have been several variations in its application. This period 
witnesses a combination of pragmatism with the classical principles of western 
civilization and an effort to transcend the principles of both trends. 
Within this evolution, there was a development in two general areas of 
. 
application 0 One of these concerns the matter of socialism and all the implica-
tions connected with economic and political controls. The other treats the 
question of pacifism and includes the entire discussion concerning the use of 
violent and non-violent resistance. 
Now that we have seen the general outline of the evolution of Niebuhr's 
thought, we are in a position to examine each of the stages more closely in 
order to obtain insight into his mature ethical position. The Social Gospel 
doctrine which formed one of the two maj or elements of Niebuhr's thought in the 
1920's was largely influenced by Walter Rauschenbusch who was its most 
important theologian. The theory put forth by Rauschenbusch was that the con-
I 
cept of the Kingdom of God is the central approach for both religion and society. 
\ 
3 
." 
,The Kingdom came to b~ identified with a gradual growth in the perfeotion of 
laws, customs, institutions of education, and everything else that comprised 
• 
the collective life of humanity. The manner in which this aim was to be ef-
fected was through faith and through knowledge which consists in a scientific 
, .. -
comprehension of social life. It is true that Rauschenbusch did not think that 
the Kingdom of God could be established on earth in its fullness because he 
knew that social change would not abolish the sinfulness of man. But many of 
his followers differed from him on this point and fully expected to see the es-
tablishment of the Kingdom of God in history. For them, the Kingdom of God 
thus became synonomous \yith historical progress. Egoism and power would not 
destroy the progress provided that human relations would be controlled by love, 
that a policy of non-violence would be established in politic'll relfltfnnR. i'lnd 
1 
Wid i. paCifism would. prevail in international relations. 
The other major influence during this early period was the social appli-
cation of the instrumentalist version of American pragmatism associated with 
John Dewey. This was based on the theory that social change could be effected 
by means of education and experiment. It was felt that the only factor which 
prevented social progress was ignorance and consequently "science and. 
1Arthur Schlesinger, Ir., "Reinhold Niebuhr's Role in American 
Political Thought and Life," Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and 
Political Thought, ed. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York: 
Macmillan Co., 1956), pp. 127-28. 
\ 
4 
education were looked upon as the tools for working out the .great eoonomio and 
political issues. 2 ' 
• 
In 1936, Niebuhr published an-article in which he enumerated a set of 
propositions that characterize the conventual liberalism of the early period. 
,4;-
a. That injustice is caused by ignorance and will yield to education 
and greater intelligence. 
b. That civilization is becoming gradually more moral and that it is a 
sin to challenge either the inevitability or the efficacy of gradualness. 
c. That the character of individuals rather than social systems and 
arrangements is the guarantee of justice in society. 
d. That appeals to love, justice, good-will and brotherhood are 
bound to be efficacious in the end. If they have not been so to date we 
must have more appeals to love, justice, good-will and brotherhood. 
e. That goodness makes for happiness and that the increasing know-
ledge of this fact wil~ overcome human selfishness ,and greed. 
f. That wars are stupid and can therefore only be caused by p~ople 
who are more stupid than those who recognize the stupidity of war. 
The transiti.on of 'f\Ti c.t-..l!hr' s thought 1nh +11;:> ;,"\('!ond major phase was 
';v-.;;~l va .It:) WdY ell: Lilt: L.i.m~ tllat he wrote the article ~rom which we have just. 
quoted. His dissatisfaction with liberalism rested on the fact that its creed 
blinds it to the real world. This dissatisfaction was foreshadowed by an 
earlier insight which made a distinction between what he called the "prophet" 
4 
and the "statesman." The prophet, for him, was the man committed to God 
while the statesman was the man committed to the sinful world. _ This 
2Ibid • , pp. 129-30. 
3Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Blindness of Liberalism," Radical Religion, 
I, No.4 (Autumn, 1936), p. 4. 
4Reinhold Niebuhr, Leaves from the Notebook of ~ Tamed Cynic (New 
York: Willett, Clark, and Colby Co., 1929), PP. xii-xiv. 
\ 
5 
distinction gave rise to a certain opposition which he felt existed between the 
Social Gospel and pragmatism. Instead of being fused into one as the liberal 
• 
creed presupposed, these two streams seemed to be a paradox. The Social 
Gospel lacked the sense of the re1.Citive since it placed its emphasis on the 
law of love. Pragmatism, on the other hand, lacked a sense of the absolute 
because of its insistence that expert knowledge could overcome all difficulties. 
Niebuhr's solution to the problem appeared on two levels. On the level of 
strategy, he prescribed the balance of power; on the level of tactics, his 
answer was found in adherence to Marxist principles 05 
At this point, we find Niebuhr in the second phase of the evolution of 
his thought. Although it is true that he never felt completely at ease about 
accepting the Marxist princioles in their entirety / he did subscribe to them 
quite extensively and they did influence his thinking profoundly.· In. Idt:;a~rdl, 
it might be said that the defects of the liberal philosophy seemed to be the 
strength of Marxism. Kenneth Thompson describes these as follows: 
Liberalism had failed to relate the individual organically to society; 
Marxism made society the beginning and the end. Liberalism maintained 
that the individual through maximizing self-interest would miraculously 
serve the interests of all; Marxism showed that this was in practical terms 
5Schlesinger, .QJ2.. cit., po 136. 
6Kenneth Thompson I liThe Political Philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr I II 
Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social and Political Thought, ed. Charles W. 
Keg ley and Robert w. Bretall (New York: Macmillan Co 0, 1956). p. 159. 
\ 
6 
a middle-class idealogy. Liberalism concealed the conflicts of interest 
which prevail in all communities: Marxism laid bare the struggles which 
went on betwe'en diverse social and economic classes. Liberalism in-
sisted that justice could be attained through the automatic working of a 
free economic system: Marxism proclaimed that injustice was inevitable 
as long as economic inequality prevailed. 7 • 
It can be seen that Marxism dominated Niebuhr's thought during this 
period, but it must be pOinted out that his allegiance was always strictly limited 
He saw that the Communists made two basic errors. The first was that they 
found the Kingdom of God in history. Although he liked their emphasis on the 
collective aspect of man's existence, he feared that it was culminating in a 
secular religion. The Communists, he insisted, perceived the Soviet Union as 
the incarnation of the absolute. His other basic objection centered around his 
theory of power. While he liked the Marxist socialization of the economy, he 
, foared that the power which it sought to balance would simply L~~ ;.;;', , .);,..att.d in a 
new disproportion. 8 
Before we go on to consider the third and final stage in the development 
of Niebuhr's thought, we must consider the influence of liberalism and 
Marxism on his later thinking. Kenneth Thompson addresses himself to this 
qUestion and points out that Niebuhr retained certain perennial truths inherent 
in liberalism and Marxism as he embarked on his mission of discovering a 
viable theory of politics, but he stripped them of their worst fantasies. In 
7 Ibid., p. 1580 
8Schlesinger, QQ.. cit., pp. 139-40. 
" 
7 
looking at the elements of liberalism which endured in Niebuhr's thought, he 
says: 
.. 
Liberalism, for example, provides certain moral objectives which serve as 
the gentle civilizers of politi6s in our society. Together they make up , 
what Niebuhr calls the spirit Q£..liberalism, which is older than bourgeois 
culture. They include a spirit of tolerance and fairness without which life 
is reduced to an almost consistent inhumanity. Freedom or liberty is 
another moral and political objective which the spirit, if not the middle-
class ap~lication and interpretation, of liberalism bequeths to Niebuhr's 
thought 0 .. 
He goes on to say that Niebuhr rej ected Marxism more completely and more 
emphatically than liberalism but it remains at least a residual element of his 
approach 0 Thompson suggested that there are three insights from Marxist 
thought which appear to endure 0 These are summarized as follows: 
The three insights from Marxist thought 0 0 • include its emphasis on the 
social dimension of life and the collective fate of man' s existence which 
for Niebuhr implies a responsibility to seek justice at the national and in-
ternational level. He adds, however, that these organic forms of life will 
not yield to the efforts of collectivists or idealists to coerce them into new 
mechanical or artificial molds. Second, Marxism requires that the political 
and economic structure of human communities be taken seriously. It 
rej ects the belief that structures are of no importance so long as good men 
.operate these systems and structures. Third, as against the liberal con-
cept of an easy harmony of interests,Marxism postulates the idea of class 
struggle. Niebuhr finds this last idea unacceptable unless expanded to 
embrace all political struggles which endlessly go on as the sole means of 
righting t~e balance between the victims and the beneficiaries of 
injustice. 0 .. . . 
9 . Thompson, .2.2.. cit., po 162. 
lOIbid. 
.. 
\ 
. 8 
As Niebuhr's thought began to pass from the second phase of its 
development, another aspect of Marxist philosophy began to trouble him, He 
• 
saw that the Marxist conception of the nature of man as a being who would be 
, 
transfigured with the withering away of the state was unrealistic. To him, this 
. -
notion was as utopian as the sentimentality of liberalism 0 11 Throughout his 
entire career, the problem of the nature of man was basic for him. His 
thinking on the subject underwent an evolution as it did on the other issues and 
was finally presented in its mature form in his book, The Nature and Destiny of 
Man,12 which was a revised version of the Gifford Lectures which were given 
at the University of Edinburgh in 1939 0 According to John C. Bennett, the 
chapter entitled liThe Kingdom of God and the Struggle for Justice II which appears 
in the second volume of that book represents the continuing structure of his 
social ethics as well as anything that he has written .13 An understanding of 
Niebuhr's concept of the nature of man is an essential prerequisite to the 
proper understanding of his social ethics. 
l1Ibido, p. 160. 
12Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, Vol. I: Human Nature, 1941; Vol. II: Human Destiny, 
1943; one-volume edition, 1949). 
13John Co Bennett, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Social Ethics, II Reinhold 
Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought I ed. Charles W. 
Kegley and Robert Wo Bretall (New York: Macmillan Co., 1956), po 47. 
\ 
9 
Before we consider the various aspects of Niebuhr' 8 mature ethical 
position in detail, We must note two characteristics of his thought. First, 
.. 
there exists a certain dialectical structure in his thinking. This is most ap-
parent in his books where he puts forth his theories in detail. The result of 
, .. -
this is that there is frequently some ambiguity as to where he is placing his 
emphasis. This ambiguity can be resolved only by an analysis of his concrete 
decisions for action which can be found chiefly in his numerous articles and 
editorials. 
The other characteristic concerns his attitude toward the modern scien-
tific method. Niebuhr ad~its that "modern social and psychological sciences 
14 have been able to teach us a great deal about man and his community." At 
j'''' - ~ ... ",,("'> time, however, he recognizes their limitattcll''I ~,,:1~('\~ 1;.,., ...... ,.~ that they 
have been I. singularly Jd:.61el1t in generating wisdom in human affairs. ,,15 He 
elaborates on his position When he says: "What is insufferable is that elaborate 
claims should be made for the resources of 'science' in the clarification of our 
perplexities, when it is obvious that a most rigorous application of the 
methods of science means a denial of everything which is characteristically 
human. ,,16 
14Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 3. 
15Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Tyranny of Science, " Theology Today, X, 
No o 4 (January, 1954), p. 465. 
16Ibid. I p. 471 • 
\ 
\ 
." 
10 
'. 
Those things which Niebuhr specifically objects to in the modern 
~cientific method have been lined up by Kenneth Thompson as five illusions or 
• 
fantasies. The first is the myth of a presuppositionless science. Another is 
that science tends to conceal conglusions which fail to conform to the facts. A 
third illusion is that the position of the observer differs in physical and social 
science. In the latter, man is both the agent and the observer. The problem, 
however, is less acute when the observer is removed from his subject in time 
and place as in historical studies. The fourth illusion of the scientific 
approach results from modern conceptions of causation and prediction. Both 
the complexity of causatiQn and the intervention of contingent factors in history 
are ignored. Furthermore, prediction is possible only in terms of rough pro-
l)"'l,n~H"C], TriP fin·~l illusion is also the most persff!t""J"I+. "11 ~(') frr>quently, 
science is considered to offer the most profound method because it is the 
latest fruit of culture .17 
Yet, in spite of his disavowal of the exclusive use of the scientific 
method, Niebuhr does see its value and always insists on the considerations 
of political realities. Furthermore, his thinking is filled with many profound 
practical insights. He realizes the importance of an empirical approach along 
with a more philosophical one because he realizes that ideological sentiments 
can frequently influence judgments. Perhaps it is the curious and somewhat 
17Thompson,.QI?. cit., pp. 153-55. 
\ 
11 
unique combination of philosophical understanding and' historical realism that 
ha's earned for him widespread acclaim as America' s foremost political philo so-
• 
pher. He is constantly praised for the relevance of his thought while most 
political philosophers are criticize~_ severely for their lack of relevance. That 
this is particularly true with respect to United States foreign policy can be at-
tested by the words of Ernest W. Lefever: II There' has been very little serious 
writing which explicitly relates Judaeo-Christian ethics to the formulation and 
conduct of United States foreign policy. The many books and articles written 
by Reinhold Niebuhr over the past three decades are the major exception. 1118 
It is against this bapkground of the first two phases of the development 
of Niebuhr
' 
s thought and general characteristics which illumine the nature of 
his thinking that his mature philosophical position must be viewed. The next 
step, then, is to consider his views on human nature as they apply to the es-
tablishment of the foreign policy ethic. 
18Ernest W. Lefever, Ethics and United States Foreign Policy (New 
York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1957), p. 181. 
CHAPTER II 
• 
THE FOUNDATION OF NIEBUHR'S ETHICS 
.--
The foundation of Niebuhr's social ethics is found in his understanding 
of human nature. Much of his writing has been devoted to this topic. Almost 
every one of his books takes up the question in one form or another and each 
treatment brings out a new emphasis or new aspect while at the same time re-
maining true to the fundamental concept. Consequently, we shall begin this 
treatment by considering those aspects which are especially relevant to his 
general social ethics as well as his application to the ethics of United States 
, foreiO''''. noHcy. 
Niebuhr's concept of the nature of man begins with man' s individuality. 
"Individuality, " he· says, "is a fruit of both nature and spirit. "IOn the level 
of nature, one individual is separated from another by virtue of a physical 
organism which maintains its discrete existence and has its particular history. 
But man's genuine individuality is the product of the spirit. "Nature supplies 
the particularity but the freedom of the spirit is the cause of real individuality.,,2 
1 Niebuhr, Hu~an Nature, po 54. 
2Ibid 0, p. 55. 
12 
\ 
,. 
13 
Man, according to Niebuhr, is distinguished from animals because of his 
capacity to transcend himself. In other words, man not only has a center 
• 
within himself, but he also has a center beyond himself. Consequently, 
Niebuhr distinguishes spirit, whi~h. is man's unique capacity for self-
transcendence, from soul, which man shares with animals. From this capacity 
for self-transcendence arises man I s fundamental freedom which allows him to 
choose, develop, and shape history. 
Niebuhr describes or defines the uniqueness of the human self by em-
phasizing the three dialogues in which this self is involved. He shows . that 
lithe self is a creature which is in constant dialogue with itself, with its 
neighbors, and with God, according to the Biblical viewpoint. ,,3 An examina-
tion of each of these dialogues will serve to clarify some aspects of the nature 
of man. 
Niebuhr asserts that it is a matter of experienoe which all must admit 
that man is a creature' engaged in a continuous internal dialogue. This internal 
dialogue is something which is peculiar to the human creature. In this process, 
the self approves or disapproves its actions, it judges and excuses, it pities 
and glorifies. The self in which this dialogue is carried on 1s not the 
"rational" self in contrast to the IIsensibleli self. There are not two distinct 
selves but merely two different dimensions of the same self. This dialogue 
3Reinhold Niebuhr, The futl!. and the Dramas of History (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 4. 
\ 
14 
. 
within the self proceeds' on a number of different levele. Niebuhr lilt. them 
as follows: 
• 
Sometimes it is a dtalogue between the self as engaged in its various res-
ponsibilities and affections and the self which observes these engagem~nts 
Sometimes the dialogue is be1;Ween the self in the grip of its immediate 
necessities and biological urges I and the self as an organization of long-
range purposes and ends •. Sometimes the dialogue is between the self in 
the c.ontext of one set of loy~lties and the I?elf in the grip of contrasting 
claims and responsibilities 0 
The setting of this dialogue is the whole s.elf which includes both man's nature 
and his spirit as we described them above. It is necessary to keep this duality 
in mind. It is in the context of this organic unity of the self and its functions 
and the freedom and transcendence of the self over its functions that this inter-
nal dialogue takes. place. 
The second dialogue of the self is that which takes place constantly 
with man's various neighbors. "This may be a quality which Aristotle was 
<.-;.:, .. 1. ... ,)/ .J.escriolng by detining ti&t~ ~elf as a ~ politicon. but that definition 
would not do justice to the endless nuances and levels of the dialogue of the 
self with others. ,,5 The reason for this is that the self "is not merely dependent 
on others for its sustenance and security. It is dependent upon them for the 
image which it has of itself and for the spiritual security which is as necessary 
to the self as its social security ... 6 
4 Ibid. I p. 7. 
5 Ibid. I p. 4. 
6Ibid ., p. 4-5. 
\ 
15 
In the dialogue \vith others, there are certain conditions which Niebuhr 
discusses and which can be enumerated briefly. (1) "The self faces the other 
7-
self as a mystery which can never be fully penetrated." (2) "The self sees 
the other as an instrument for its purposes and as a.completion for its incom-
pleteness • ,,8 (3) "The self cannot be truly fulfilled if it is not drawn out of 
itself into the life of the other. ,,9 (4) "The seif recognizes the other as the 
limit of its expansiveness. ,,10 (5) "The uniqueness of the individuals which 
enter into any dialogic relation makes' each one of these relations highly unique jO 
however general may be the natural basis of the relation. 1111 (6) "While the 
self is a unique center of life it is indeterminately lopenl to other selves. 1112 
(7) liThe pattern of these dialogues is conditioned by historic factors. 1113 
liThe selfis physical and spiritual need of others is naturally satisfied 
14 
not only in casual and transient but in permanent relationship. II Thus, the 
7Ibid ., p. 30. 
8 Ibid. , p. 31. 
9 Ibid. , 
10Ibid ., p. 32. 
IIIb'd 
_1_., p. 33. 
12Ibid ~
13Ib1d 
----! 
14Ib1d , , p, 34. 
\ 
16 
dialogue with others gi'fe~ rise tO,and inClude,s man's com~nitie •• There il • 
twofold relationship of ~e individual to the community. l'lie vertical dimension , 
t 
I • ~ 
of this relationship can!be further divided into two forms • Man "looks up at the ' 
, 
! . , ' 
community as the fulfillment of his life and the sustainer of his existence. By 
,-
its organization his phy'sical and moral needs are met. ,,15 Niebuhr describes 
the nature of this form of the vertical dimension in tile following way: 
The individual is related to the community (in its various levels and ex-
tensions) in such a way that the highest reaches of his individuality are 
dependent upon the social substance out of which they arise and they must 
find their end and fulfillment in community. No simple limit can be. placed 
upon the degree of intimacy to the. community and t~e breadth and extent of 
community which the individual requires for life,. 1 
. . 
The second form of the vertical dimension is the view that the individual takes. 
when he looks down on the community "because he is, as it were, higher than 
it. It is bound to nature more inexorably than he. It knows nothing of a dimen-
sion of the eternal beyond its own existence. ',,17 Consequently, the com~unity 
tenaciously clings to life and is often willing to sacrifice every dignity t<? pre-
serve its existence. The other dimension of the individual's relationship to the 
15Ibid., p. 35. 
16Reinhold Niebuhr I The Children of Light and !!l.!! Children of Darkness 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 48 • 
• 
17 Niebuhr, The Self and ~' Dramas of History I p. 35. 
\ 
community is the horizontal one which he "experiences 
community is in conflict with other communities. 1118 
• • 
• 
17 
•• whenever his 
The third dialogue, which is the· dialogue with· God, reveals the self 
, 
in its ultimate search for meaning •. ~_This search takes many forms, but Niebuhr 
feels that it is possible to place them into three general categories. "The 
first category embraces all religious responses in which the self seeks to 
break through a universal rational system in order to assert its significance ul-
timately. ,,19 It may do this individually or in the assertion of the significance 
of the collective self. In the latter case, the individual is so conscious of his 
finiteness that he can only find significance in the community. The second 
category is generally defined as IImysticism" and stands at the opposite pole of 
idolatry. "It is • • • a,n heroic effort to transcend all finite values and systems 
of meaning, including the' self as particular existence and to arrive at 
universality and 'unconditioned' being. ,,20 The third t',.', ' "'i ' , 
faiths of Judaism and Christianity. "These faiths interpret the self's 
experience with the ultimate in the final reaches of its self-awareness as a 
dialogue with God. This idea of a dialogue between the self and God assumes 
the personality of God. • • ' ... 21 In describing this category, Gordon Harland 
18Ibid ., p. 38. 
19 . Ibid., p. 63. 
20 Ibid., p. 64. 
21Ibid. , 
, 
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summarizes Niebuhr's thinking On the matter as tollows: 
In this dialogue man is convicted not for his finiteness but for his sin, and 
he is convicted by a love that has the power not onll' to convict but also to 
uphold and redeem. In this dialogue he learns that the attempt to seek the 
fulfillment of the ~lf from the standpoint of the .self are both idolatrous 
and self-defeating; that the self can find fulfillment only when centered in 
God; and that this ~ban be found not when self-fUlfillment is sought as the 
conscious end I but for the glory of God only. 22 
We have already seen that man's capacity for self-transcendence is 
closely associated with his freedom. A further examination of this freedom is 
necessary for a proper understanding of Niebuhr's concept of the nature of man 
and his social ethics. 
Man's freedom enables him to rise above purely natural process. In 
Christian Realism and Political Problems, Niebuhr writes: 
According to the Christian view, the human self arises as an independent 
and self-determining force in the very social process and historical con-
tinuum in which it is also a creature. Its freedom is a radical one because 
the self i~ not easily kept within the confines of nature's harmonies. This 
freedom is ~he basis of the self's destructive as well as creatj.ve powers; 
and there is no simple possibility of ma~dng nice distinctions between 
human destructiveness and creativity. 2 . 
And ih The Self 2.ru! the Dramas of History, he puts this same notion into a 
slightly different perspective: 
22Gordon Harland, ~ Thought 2! Reinhold Niebuhr (New York: 
,Oxford University Press I 1960), p. 62. 
23Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems I P. 6. 
Cf. also: Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness I 
i 
Pp. 59-60. 
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It is obvious that ~e self's freedom over natural proces.s enables it to be 
a creator of historidal events. Both its memory of past events and its 
capacity to proj ect goals transcending the necessities of nature enable it 
to create the new level of reality which we know as htmlan history. But 
the self is not simply a creator of this new dimension, for it is also a 
creature of the web of events, in the creation of which it participates. 24 
Here Niebuhr squarely faces the co~troversy between voluntarism and deter-
minism. He considers three elements:nature, r~ason, and history. In refuSing 
to admit that nature, reason, and history strictly determine man's activity, he 
is not so naive as to fail to recognize their influence on man's actions. All 
three elements condition and in some respects limit what man will do. Conse-
quently, he views man as a basically free creature whose activity is 
. 
influenced by nature, reason, and the historical context in which he finds 
himself • 
From the foregoing, we can put together most of the elements in 
Niebuhr's concept of the essential nature of man. He summarizes it as follows: 
The essential nature of man contains two elements; and there are corres-
pondingly two elements in the original perfection of man. To the essential 
nature of man belong, on the one hand, all his natural endowments and 
determinations, his physical and social impulses, his sexual and racial 
differentiations, in short his character as a creature imbedded in the 
natural order. On the other hand, his essential nature also includes the 
freedom of his spirit, his transcendence over natural process and finally 
his self-transcendence. 25 
Thus, man's essential nature contains two contradictory elements: finiteness 
24Niebuhr, The Self and the DramC?- of History, p. 41. 
25Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 270. 
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and freedom. But, it must be noted that man never really attatns the fullness 
,of his essential nature ~ There is a difference between what man is essentially 
• 
:~md what he is in the e*istential order of things. 
The basis of the contradiction between essential man and existential 
,,~-
man is found in the two components of man I s nature • Man I s finiteness is the 
occasion for his sin. This happens in three ways. First, "man is insecure and 
involved in natural contingency; he seeks to overcome his insecurity by a will-
to-power which overreaches the limits of human creatureliness ... 26 Moreover, 
"man is ignorant and involved in the limitations of a finite mind; but he pretends 
that he is not limited ... 27 . In these two cases, sin becomes identified with 
pride. In the third case, "man seeks to solve the problem of the contradiction 
of finiteness and freedom, not by seeking to hide his finiteness and compre-
hending the world into himself, but by seeking to hide his freedom and by 
'-'u losing himself in some aspect of the world's vitalities. II- In this situation, 
Niebuhr would call the sin sensuality rather than pride. 
But Niebuhr insists that the uniqueness of the Biblical approach to the 
human problem lies in its subordination of the problem of finiteness to the 
problem of sin. We have already indicated that finiteness is only the occasion 
2 6Ibid ., p. 178: 
27Ibid ., pp~ 178-79. 
2 8 Ibid., p. 179. 
\ 
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tor sin. liThe contrast between what man is truly and essentially and what he 
has become is apparent: even to those who do not und~rstand that this contrast 
\ , " 
• 
l,S to be found in every human b,eing and has its seat in the will of man 
, 
himself .11 29 It is the freedom of man's will which has been corrupted by origina 
",-
sin that makes it possible for man to sin. This position has been summarized 
as follows: 
The will is bound. It is not bound by fate or by creation. It is bound to 
the interests of the self which, in contradiction to its essential nature, 
seeks the things of the self for the sake of the self and thus deepens the 
alienation of the self from its true self. Nor can the will so bound, unwill 
its condition by willing. The condition must be restored. That the con-
dition is restored through the person, work, and promise of Jesus Christ 
is the message of the. Christian faith. 30 
In summary, then, we see that man's failure to achieve the fullness of 
his essential nature is, according tq Niebuhr, the result of the corruption of 
his freedom of will through original sin. In addition, the element of finiteness 
in the essential nature of man produces the insecurity which Is the occasion for 
the individual to choose freely in contradiction to the law which his essential 
nature gives to him. Now that we have viewed both the essential and existen-
tial aspects of the nature of man, we are in a position to examine the law or 
norm of morality which arises out of man's nature and governs it. 
Niebuhr tells us that lIit is important to distinguish between the essen-
29 Ibid., p.265 •. 
30Harland, Q1?.. cit., pp. 79-80. 
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tial nature of man and 1:h,~ virtue and perfection which would represent the 
normal expression of that nature. ,,31 We will recall that there are two elements 
• 
in this essential nature. The first is man's finiteness and the virtue and per-
fection which corresponds to it is usually designated as the natural law. "It 
,--
is the law which defines the proper peIiormance of his functions, the normal 
harmony of his impulses and the normal social relation between himself and his 
fellows within the limitations of the natural order. ,,32 The second element in 
man's essential nature is his freedom of spirit and the virtues which correspond 
to it "are analogous to the 'theological' virtues of Catholic thought, namely 
faith, hope, and love. ,,33 ~Niebuhr validates these as basic requirements of 
man's freedom as follows: 
Faith in the providence of God is a necessity of freedom because, without 
it the anxiety of freedom tempts man to seek a self-sufficiency and self-
mastery incompatible with his dependence upon forces which he does not 
control. Hope is a particular form of that faith. It deals with the 
future 0 • 0 • 
Love is both an independent requirement of this same freedom and a 
derivative of faith 0 Love is a requirement of freedom because the com-
munity to which man is impelled by his social nature is not possible to him 
merely upon the basis of his 'gregarious impulse 0 • • • Since men are 
separated from one another by the uniqueness and individuality of each 
spirit, however closely they may be bound together by ties of nature, they 
cannot relate themselves to one another in terms which will do justice to 
31Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 270. 
32Ibid • 
33Ib 'd 
_1_0' p. 271. 
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both the bonds of nilture and the freedom of their .p1tit 1f thoy atl not r'@- . 
lated in terms of love. • • • This "I" and "Thou II relationship is impossible . 
without the presupposition of faith for two reasons: (1) Without freedom 
from anxiety man is so enmeshed in the vicious circle·of egocentricity, so 
concerned about himself, that he cannot release himself for the adventure 
of love. (2) Without relation to God, the world of freedom in which spirit 
must meet spirit is so obscured that human beings constantly sink to the 
level of things in the human imagination. 34 
Prom the foregoing, we can see that love is the norm of human nature. 
It is a love based on faith and not unrelated to hope. Niebuhr explicitly states 
that this is the norm when he says that lithe law of his (i. e ., man I s) nature is -
love, a harmonious relation of life to life in obedience to the divine center and 
source of his life. ,,35 Later on, he even goes further when he says that "love 
is • • • the end term of any system of morals. It is the moral requirement in 
. 36 
which all schemes of justice are fulfilled and negated. " 
Now that we have seen that Niebuhr's primary ethical norm is the law of 
love, we must examine the details and meaning of this ucrrn.. IL.:; tells us: lilt 
contains three terms: (a) the perfect relation of the soul to God in which 
obedience is transcended by love, trust, and confidence ••• ; (b) the per-
fect internal harmony of the soul with itself in all of its desires and impulses; 
and (c) the perfect harmony of life with life: •••• "37 But, he also distin-
34Ibid ., pp. 271-72. 
35 Ibid., p. 16. 
3 6 Ibid., p. 295. 
37Ibid ., pp. 288-89. 
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guishes between agape irhich is the heedless, self-forgetful, and self-
. r 
sacrificing love of Christ in the New Testament and mutual love in which the 
,- . 
• \ , 
concern of one person fQr the interests· of another prompts and elicits a recipro-
, 
cal affection. Niebuhr says in Christian Realism and Political Problems that 
these two kinds of love cannot be divided by any neat line. 38 Nevertheless, 
the distinction is of considerable importance in the development of his ethical 
theory. It can be understood best if we study the relationship that exists 
between them. 
Niebuhr constantly refers to this relationship as paradoxical. Sacrifi-
cial love is an act in history. At the same time, it must transcend history. 
Sacrificial love cannot justify itself in history because the self-realization of 
each individual depends upon the reciprocal affection of mutual love and be-
cause conflicting social demands are satisfied only in mutual love. "Mutual 
love and loyalty are, in a sense, the highest possibilities of social 
life, •••• ,,39 But, the kind of self-giving which has self-realization as its 
result must not have self-realization as its consciOUS end; otherwise the self 
by calculating its 'engagement will not escape from itself completely enough to 
40 be enlarged." Thus we see that "from the standpoint of history mutual love 
38Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 160. 
39 Niebuhr , Paith and History, p.18S. 
40Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems I p. 141. 
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is the highest good" but "mutuality is not a possible achievement if it is made 
the intent1.on and go~l of tinY action. ,,41 Consequently, mutual love needs sac-
~ . 
rificial love in order for i.t to remain mutual love. In view of this, Niebuhr can 
c~ll the sacrificial love ~gape) oLthe New Testament "the support of all 
historical ethics. ,,42 
The sacrificial love which we have been considering has a threefold 
, 
relation of transcendence to mutual love 0 First, agape "completes the incom-
pleteness of mutual love (eros), for the latter is always arrested by the fact 
that it seeks to relate life to life from the standpoint of the self and for the sake 
of the self's own happiness. ,,43 Second, "the Cross represents a transcendent 
perfection which clarifies obscurities of history and defines the limits of what 
is possible in historic development. ,,44 Niebuhr then goes on to show that the 
final justification of agape is never found in history because of the necessity of 
mutuality. Thus, even though agape always remains the norm, it is also true 
that no decision can simply conform to agape. This is the paradox which we 
discussed above. Finally, the third relation of transcendence is that lithe 
41 Niebuhr, Human Destiny, Pp. 68-69. 
42 Ibid ., p. 69. 
43Ibid ., p. 82. 
44IbiQ.., p. 86. 
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" ' 
Cross represents a perfeption which contradicts the false pretensions of virtue 
in history and which reveals the contrast between manls sinful self-assertion , 
apd the divine agape .,,48 
• 
Before we can coinplete the picture containing the chief positive ele-
'~. , .. -
ments in Niebuhrl s ethical scheme, we must consider the notion of justice 
which he sets up as a correlative of agape. He does not attempt a definition of 
justice because, for him, justice has no independent basis. Rather, it is a re-
lational term and has meaning only in connection with agape. It is the embodi-
ment of agape in the structures of society. 46 The relationship is a dialectical 
one analogous to the relati9n of mutual love and sacrificial love. 47 It must be 
considered from both aspects: the relation of love to justice and the relation of 
justice to love. 
The relationship of love to justice is such that it both fulfills and 
negates justice. 48 Niebuhr tells us that love fulfills justice "because the obU-
gation of life to life is more fully met in love than is possible in any scheme of 
equity and justice. ,,49 It negates justice "because love makes an end of the 
45Ibid., p. 89. 
46 3 Harland, .QE.. cit !I p. 2 • 
47Niebuhr, Human Destiny, p. 247. 
48Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 295. Cf. also: Niebuhr, Paith and 
History, p. 193. 
49Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 295. 
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nicely calculated less and more of structures of Justice p It .,does not carefully 
arbitrate between the needs of the self and of the other since it meets the 
• 
. 50 
needs of the other without concern for the self 0" The higher possibilities 
of love always stand over every system of justice. 
When it comes to relating justice to love,. the basic relationship is not 
changed, but the relationship, viewed in this way, does take on a new per-
spective. The complexities of this relationship must be viewed in two dimen-
sions. One is the dimension of the rules and laws of justice while the other 
is the dimension of the structures of justice. The difference between them is 
that the former deals with an abstraction: the latter with the embodiment of 
justice in history. 51 The rules and laws of justice have both a positive and 
negative element in their relation to love. Positively, "they extend the sense 
of obligation toward the other, (a) from an immediately felt obligation, 
prompted by obvious need, to a continued obligation expn;s:::;c'-': ... fIXed princi-
pIes of mutual support; (b) from a simple relation between a self and one 
lotherl to the complex relations of the self and the 'others:' and (c) finally 
from the obligations discerned by the individual self, to the wider obligations 
which the community defines from its more impartial perspective. ,,52 
50Ibid • 
51Niebuhr, Human Destiny, p. 247. 
52 Ibid ., p. 251. 
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¥egatively, "they are merely approximations in so far as justioe presuppose. a 
tendency of various 'men}bers of a community to take advantage of each other, or 
, I 
to be more concerned with their own weal than with that of- 6thers. ,,53 
In summary, then, we see that the maj or elements in Niebuhr's ethical 
system consist in three analogous pairs of concepts based on the fundamental 
duality in the makeup of man. This duality has 'been described in terms of 
nature and spirit. All of these pairs has two characteristics in common. First, 
each pair is composed of terms which are dialectically and somewhat , 
paradoxically related. Second, there is a term in each pair which corresponds 
to the spiritual element inI?an' s makeup. This term always stands in such a 
relationship to its mate that it includes it while at the same time it transcends 
it. These pairs correspond to three aspects of man's activity: its source, the 
activity itself, and its result or achievement. The first pair which deals with 
the source of man I s activity describes' his nature in terms of his existential 
nature and his essential nature which we considered from various aspects. The 
second pair is that of mutual love and sacrificial love and involves the ac-
tivity of the human individual. Man's achievement is considered in the third 
pair which consists of justice, on the one hand, and agape on the other. It Is 
within this framework that Niebuhr's social ethics forms. 
At this point, it seems necessary to consider just what ethics means to 
53Ibid ., pp. 251-52. 
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" Niebuhr. From our pre~ous considerations, it might seem that his ethios has a 
i 
predominantly theologicbl foundation. Certainly it has a theological influence. 
(\ 
• 
In a recent article, Danl Rhoade~ describes the manner in which Niebuhr's 
ethics arises out of theOlogy and political analysis. He gives an account of 
Niebuhr's basic theology by saying that disinterestedness or selflessness is the 
absolute ideal and that devotion to it is the essence of the Christian faith. 54 
He goes on to say that Niebuhr is confronted with the fact that egOism (a con-
dition in which man's higher capacities are limited because of human finitude) 
and egotism (unfaith, distrust, and unbelieving pride) are existent in the world 
and are heightened on the .collective level. At the same time, Niebuhr 
realizes that the strategy of calling upon reason and religious devotion to over-
come egoism and egotism in the political arena is impractical 0 55 It is against 
this background that Rhoades shows the nature of Niebuhr· s ethics. Theology 
lays down the absolute norms and determines that his basic method will be 
teleological. His political analysis is controlled by his theology in that it is 
restructed to explaining the heightened forms of egOism and egotism, which 
are antitheses of his absolute norm, on the collective level. From his 
political analysis comes the utilitarian aspect of Niebuhr's ethics. In other 
54Dan Rhoades, "The Prophetic Insight and Tht'0I't ... ti.:'~:-k;.~:y!.i .. "".,: 
Inadequacy ci 'Christian Re-alism# 1M !",,':'~: ... "'$# L\'''\.'Y ('-'"\. .... :"' .... ~,,·r .. !..~~-{ .. .t.~. J. 
55Ibid ., pp. 3-5. 
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words, his ethics is mo~e concerned with immediate qonsequences than with 
absolute ends even tho~h the absolute ideal remains: in judgment upon each 
• 
particular act. As a result, lithe ethics deals with the polarity between the 
I 
: 56 
idea and the 'real. III 
The question of the place of theology in Niebuhr's ethics has relevance 
in accordance with the purpose of this thesis only insofar as it clarifies the 
question of what Niebuhr himself was trying to do. Consequently, the Rhoades 
analysis has not been introduced for discussion in itself. Onels inclination to 
agree or disagree with this opinion would depend on his own views of philoso-
phy and theology. I submit that Niebuhr himself would not agree with the 
Rhoades analysis even though it probably represents what most other men would 
think on the subj ect. 
Niebuhr does not seem to be at all interested in the question of philos-
ophy versus theology. Rather, his whole approach sel:..:u~ tv be an attempt to 
disregard these categories and present a view of the nature of man and morality 
which comprises the totality of manls nature as. a limited being who at the same 
time transcends these limits. These can be seen from the manner in which he 
describes the fundamental duality in manls makeup which we have just con-
sidered. He also brings this out when, in speaking of the Origin of the norm of 
morality, he says: "The ~thics of the Cross, therefore, clarifies I but does 
5 6 Ibid. I p. 4. 
'. 
3l 
not create, a norm which is given by the very constitution of selfhood. ,,57 
That Niebuhr'seems to be aiming at avoiding the traditional distinction 
• 
between philosophy and theology can be further seen by considering his 
frequent attacks on Catholic natur~! law theory. In general, these attacks 
have centered around two poles. The first, which is relevant to our present 
consideration of the relation between philosophy and theology, deals with the 
distinction between reason and faith or the natural and the supernatural. 
Niebuhr looks upon the Thomistic scheme as dividing a coherent whole into a 
"two-story world with a classical base and a Christian second story • .,58 The 
second area of attack is the alleged failure of Thomistic natural law ethics to 
take into account the contingencies of history. We will consider this aspect 
later when we take up the question of the application of his general ethical 
theory. 
The basic pOint of difference between Niebuhr's position and natural 
law ethics is, according to Niebuhr, the latter's unbounded confidence in 
human reason. He interprets Catholic doctrine as holding that fallen man lacks 
the capacity for the relation of communion with God in faith I hope, and love 
while at the same time insisting that man's reason and capacity for natural 
justice were not seriously impaired as a result of original sin. 59 Niebuhr 
57 Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of History, p. 232. 
58Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 189. 
59 Niebuhr , Human Nature, p. 281. 
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feels that this distinction between the natural and the supernatural or between 
reason and faith indicat~s a lack of appreciation of the finiteness of man's 
.' 
reason. The result is that man is defined as a rational creature and the inde-
terminate relations of the individual to himself, to his fellow-men, and to God 
are viewed as a donum superadditumo 60 Niebuhr's position, on the other hand, 
attempts to unite, as we have seen, all of these elements into man's essential 
nature which is known and understood partly through reason and partly through 
revelation which always work together. In commenting on the Catholic view 
and the ethical position derived from the distinction we have just noted I 
Niebuhr writes: 
These ultimate requirements of the Christian ethic are not counsels of 
perfection or theological virtues of the sort which merely completes an 
otherwise incomplete natural goodness or virtue. Nor can they be sub-
tracted from man without making his freedom a source of sinful infection. 
They are indeed counsels of perfection in the sense that sinful man lacks 
them and is incapable of achieving themS But they are basic and not sup-plementary ~equirements of his freedom. 1 , 
From these observations of Niebuhr's attack on the natural law, we can 
see that in his own view he is not concerned with distinguishing between 
philosophy and theology. Nor does he deny the necessity and validity of the 
use of man's rational powers. (We shall consider this pOint more in detail 
later.) He only insists that man's reason is limited and tainted both because of 
60Niebuhr I Christian Realism and Political Problems, pp. 188-89. 
61 Niebuhr, Human Nature I po 54 0 
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man IS nature as a limited creature and because of the sinful element introduced 
ip.to that nature by original sin. The role of revelation in his ethics is 
. ,,~ . 
primarily one of clarification 0 It enables us to see the nature of man in its 
totality. It is important because this would be impossible by simply using 
.,~-
man I S limited rational powers. 
In summary, we have considered Niebulll-' s views on the nature of man 
and the basic norm of morality which is the law of love. In view of the 
theological considerations that enter into his general ethical theory, we found 
it necessary to consider the role of theology in the construction of his ethics 
and conclude that his orien,tation is that of a Christian philosopher. On this 
basis, then, we proceed to consider the application of his theory to the socio-
political situation, in general, and to United States foreign policy, in 
particular 0 
, 
, 
CHAPTER TIl 
• 
THE TRANSITION TO SOCIAL ETHICS 
.--
In 1932, Niebuhr's book, Moral Man and Immoral Society, drew a sharp 
distinction, as the title indicates, between the moral behavior of individuals 
and that of social groups.1 Since that time he has modified the position in-
dicated in this title but the distinction does, nevertheless, indicate something 
of the general nature of his position regarding the difference between individual 
and collective morality. Now, as a preliminary to the consideration of the pro-
blem of applying the norm of love to social ethics, we must consider this dis-
tinction between individual and collective morality as it is viewed by 
Niebuhr. 
We have already noted that man is related to the community in both 
horizontal and vertical dimensions. The horizontal relationship is experienced 
whenever his community is in conflict with other communities. In the vertical 
dimenSi.on, we see that man looks up to the community which is the fulfillment 
of his life and the sustainer of 'his existence. But, he also looks down on the 
1 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932). 
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community because he is higher than it for the reason that the community is 
bound more inexorably to nature than .he is. 2 It is on this basis primarily that 
• Niebuhr1s position that "as soon as a third person is introduced into the relation 
even the most perfect love requires a rational estimate of conflicting needs and 
interests 0 ,,3 Thus, in community, the more complex situation necessitates 
greater difficulties in rising above the demands 'of nature to the full realization 
of the ideal of love. 
Niebuhr gives a number of characteristics of communities which 
account for the increased:difficulty of attaining the moral idea on the collective 
level. All of these are in some way the result of the relationship of power to the 
community. Consequently, before we consider these characteristics I it will be 
helpful to consider in some detail in what his notion of power consists and how 
it is related to the ethical ideal. 
Social power, for Niebuhr, has two aspects which determine the 
quality of the order and harmony of a given community and are essential and 
perennial aspects of community organization. One is the coercive and organ-
izing power of the government; the other is the balance of the vitalities and 
. 
forces in any given social situation which is generally referred to as the equ.l-
librium or. balance of power. Both of these contain pos sibilities of contradicting 
2 Niebullr , Th~.fuill.~ the Dramas of History, pp. 35-38. 
3Nieb~hr I Human Destiny, p. 2480 
, 
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the law of brotherhood~ The former may degenerate into tyranny; the latter into 
4 
,'anarchy. But in ordei to understand the relevance of povJer on the collective 
• 
level, it will be necessary to consider Niebuhr's concept of power in general. 
We have already seen that man, because of his finlteness and sin, is 
,,-
in a state of insecurit}i and that he seeks to overcome this1!nsecurity by a will-
to-power. The effect of this will-to-power is 'that it disburbs the harmony of 
creation if it is directed improperly. In religious terms, this disturbance is 
called sin and its definitive characteristic is pride; 5 in moral and social 
terms, it is injustice. The injustice occurs because man strives to overcome 
his insecurity by asserting his power in subordinating the lives of others to 
his own will 0 6 
4Ibid ., pp. 257-58. 
5Cf • Rhoades, .QE.. cit., pp. 3-7. Niebuhr here is attdc:'J'd on 
theological grounds for considering pride as the definitive characteristic of 
sin as he does in Human Nature (PP. 179, 188). Mr. Rhoades pOints out 
that earlier in the same work, Niebuhr cons~ders the primal sin to be unfaith, 
distrust, or unbelieving pride. Mr. Rhoades regards this to be more accurate 
theologically because sin primarily has to do with man's relation to God. This 
criticism seems to coincide with the position taken by Fr. Gustave Weigel,S.J. 
in his article entitled "Authority in Theology" which appears in Reinhold 
Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought, ed. Charles W. 
Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York: Macmillan Co., 1956), pp. 367-78. 
6Niebuhr, Human Nature, pp. 178-79. 
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Niebuhr then go~s on to accept Bertrand Russ~ll' s distinction between 
j ~ • 
! 
two forms of the pride of power. 7 Niebuhr writes that in one form "The human 
• 
ego assumes its self-su,fficiency and self-mastery and imagines itself secure 
against all vicissitudes 0,,8 This form is present in some degree in all huma'n 
beings but rises to greater heights among those individuals or classes who 
possess greater degrees of social power. The other form is "the lust for power 
which has pride at its end. 119 At first glance, it seems as though the second 
form which we hav~ just described does rise out of man f s insecurity but that 
the first does not. However, Niebuhr pOints out that the distinction is justified 
as long as it is regarded as strictly provisional. The individual or group which 
possess the first form of the pride of power is always faced with the possibility 
of losing that power and thus there is a drive to maintain the secure position. 
Thus, "the will-to-power is an expression of insecurity even when it has 
achieved ends which, from the perspective of an ordinary mortal, would seem to 
guarantee complete security. ,,10 
In general, Niebuhr classifies power under two major headings: 
spiritual and physical. Spiritual power is further divided into two forms. One 
7Bertrand Russell, Power, New Social Analysis (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1948), pp. 15ff. 
8,Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 188. 
9 Ibid • 
10Ibid ., p. 194. 
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bf these is the rational 'wherein reason is the instrument used in advancing the 
claims of one individual' against another. It can be either just or unjust depen-
• 
ding on how it is used. In the other form of spiritual power, one individual or 
group enslaves another through sp'i],itual vitalities such as mental or emotional 
energy, the pretension or possession of virtue, the prestige of an heroic life, 
or the prestige of a gentle birth. On the practical level, there is always an 
admixture of both the spiritual and the physical. 11 
Power, for Niebuhr, is not something that is intrinsically evil. His own 
words make this clear: "But power cannot be evil of itself, unless life itself be 
regarded as evil. For life ~s power. Life is never pure form or reason. It is 
inherently dynamic. Even the purest 'reason' is power. ,,12 His discussion of 
power aims at showing the great possibility of injustice that derives from power 
since power is frequently sought by the human individual or group as an expres-
sion of pride which has its source in human finiteness and insecurity. 
Now that we have considered the general nature of power and its place 
in Niebuhr's philosophy, we are in a position to consider in greater detail the 
reasons which he gives for the increased difficulty of attaining the ideal of love 
on a collective basis. We have seen that man's finiteness and sin give rise to 
insecurity. This insecurity gives rise to a will-to-power and when this will-to-
11 Ibid 0 , pp. 260-61. 
12Reinhold Niebuhr, "Power and Justice," Christianity and Society, 
VII1, No.1 (Winter, 1942), p. 10. 
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power becomes excessive, it results in a disorder which has the religious 
dimension of pride or sin and the moral and social dimension of injustice. In 
• 
other words, it is a contradiction of the ideal of love. Now, Niebuhr gives two 
reasons for distinguishing the disorder (pride) on the individual and collective 
.,~-
levels. First, it is necessary because even though group pride has its source 
in individual attitudes, it achieves a certain authority over the individual and 
because it develops organs of will it seems to become an independent center of 
moral life. Second, the distinction is necessary because the pretensions and 
claims of the collective unit exceed those of the individual with the result that 
the group is more arrogant '. hypocritical, self-centered I and more ruthles s in 
the pursuit of its ends. This is true to such an extent that the individual will 
frequently seek identification with the group for the purpose of attaining his 
more individualistic and selfish ends 0 13 
Frequently, it is asserted that the will-to-power of the group is simply 
the result of the instinct for survival and" not the result of rational calculation. 
The basis for this contention is a view which regards the group as having 
developed organs of will but lacking any sort of mind which is the basis for 
self-transcendence as well as responsible moral conduct. On this point 
Niebuhr counters by admitting that it is true "that the group possesses only an 
inchoate 'mind
' 
and that its organs of self-transcendence and self-criticism 
13Niebuhr, Human Nature, pp 0 208-90 
\ 
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are very unstable and e~hemeral compared to its organs of will, 1114 but then 
goes on to prove that the activity of the group, in general, and the nation, 15 
• 
in particular, is spiritual (or rational) in character. He writes: 
The most conclusive proof that the egotism of nations is a characteristic 
of the spiritual life, and not merely an expression of the natural impulse 
of survival, is the fact that its most typical expressions are the lust-for-
power, pride (comprising considerations of prestige and "honour") , con-
tempt toward the other (the reverse side of pride and its necessary 
concomitant in a world in which self-esteem is constantly challenged by 
the achievements of others); hypocrisy (the inevitable pretension of con-
forming to a higher norm than self-interest); and finally the claim of moral 
autonomy by which the self-deification of the social group is made explicit 
by its presentation of itself as the source and end of existence .16 
Some of the expressions of characteristics of the nation which we have 
. 
just enumerated were listed by Niebuhr in a slightly different fashion in Moral 
Man and Immoral Society to indicate the differences between the individual and 
collective selves and to account for the increased difficulties in attaining the 
ethical ideal on the collective level. Among the other characteristics of the 
14 Ibid., p. 21 0 • 
15Niebuhr frequently uses the nation as the prime example of a group. 
As he puts it: liThe egotism of racial, national and socio-economic groups is 
most consistently expressed by the national state because the state gives the 
collective impulses of the nation such instruments of power and presents the 
imagination with such obvious symbols of its discrete collective identity that 
the national state is most able to make absolute claims for itself I to enforce 
those claims by power, and to give them plauSibility and credibility by the 
majesty and panoply of its apparatus. II (Human Nature I p. 2090) 
16Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 211. 
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\ group which make for the greater difficulty about which we ~re speaking is the 
fact that groups can only know the needs of other people at second hand and 
• 
indirectly 0 Since sympathy and justice depend on a perception of need, there 
i$ obviously a greater d~ficulty in achieving ethical relationships .17 Also, 
... -
e'ven though he insists that there is at least an inchoate "mind" in the group, 
it cannot be denied that the group is held together much more by force and 
emotion than by mind. This, too, adds to the difficulty of attaining the ethical 
ideal. 18 The hypocrisy which was mentioned above is still another characteris-
tic of the nation or group which adds to the difficulty.19 Yet, in spite of the 
fact that Niebuhr sees many characteristics of the group which account for the 
differences between individual and collective morality, he finds it impossible 
to draw any neat line between them because of the nature of the relationship of 
the individual and the group or community. 20 
Prom the foregoing analysis of the nature of man and the comrnuni~· 1 i~·t.'" 
see eat Xiebunr views r::an on the existential level as basically insecure. His 
effort to overcome this insecurity 1s manifested in a will-to-power which can be 
17Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral SOCiety, pp. 83-85. 
18 Ibid 0, pp 0 88-89. 
19 Ibid., p. 95. 
20Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, p. 48. 
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channeled in such a w&,.y as to help him toward the achievetnent of the norm of 
.' 
4 
. ' 
Jove which is laid dow~ by his essential nature. This will-to-power can also 
• 
be misdirected and result in a disturbance of the harmony of. creation and pro-
,~ . , 
;1 , , 
duce injustice among men. Because the possibility of injustice is greater on 
the collective level for the reasons which we have enumerated above, it 
follows that the achievement of the ideal of love is harder to attain in the 
group situation. Since power lies at the base of man's efforts to achieve this 
ideal and also is at the root of his failures in achieving it, Niebuhr concludes: 
"The contest of power, then, is the heart of the political life 0 ,,21 Thus, for 
him, social and political ethics are primarily concerned with the problem of the 
balance of power. 
We are now faced with the question as to how to achieve t..'lUs bc.2a::=~ 
c£ ?~'., .. == so as to e::able collective man to attain his ethical ideal. L'1 other 
words, how does the law of love, which is the the prili;'~<i ~o W vI lli1.elJuhr' S 
ethics both on the individual and collective levels, apply to social and 
political ethics? We now address ourselves to this question. In spite of the 
fact that Niebuhr's close friend and colleague, Dr. John C. Bennett, says, 
"It is very difficult to find a clear line connecting this perfect love with soc~al 
ethics, ,,22 we shall attempt to get some idea as to how Niebuhr handles this 
21Reinhold Niebuhr, "Leaves from the Notebook of a Warbound 
American," The Christian Century, LVI, No. 46 (November IS, 1939, p.140S., 
22Bennett, .QI?o cit., p. 57. 
, 
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problem. 
The question of the relation of the law of love to social ethics' is com-
. . 
plicated by a problem connected with the law itself 0 The type of love that 
Niebuhr puts down as the ideal is the sacrificial love which arises out of man's 
essential nature and is exemplified in the life of Christ. But just as we noted 
that this ideal is a practical impossibility as regards fulfillment in the existen-
tial order for an individual, so it is also an existential impossibility for the 
community. Niebuhr writes as follows regarding the meaning of the ideal and 
the impossibility of attaining it: 
In practical terms it m~ans a combination of anarchism and communism 
dominated by a spirit of love. Such perfect love as He demands would 
obviate the necessity of coercion on the one hand because men would re-
frain from transgressing upon their neighbor's rights, and on the other 
hand because such transgression would be accepted and forgiven if it did 
occur. That is anarchism, in other words 0 It would mean communism be-
cause the privileges of each would be potentially the privileges of all. 
Where love is perfect the distinctions between mine and L1.ine disappear. 
The social ideal of Jesus is as perfect and as impossible of attainment as 
his personal idea 0 23 
In spite of this realization, Niebl\hr insists that the ideal remains and must be 
applied to the concrete social situation. 
Niebuhr points out that the chief indication of the relevancy 01 the 
ideal of love to socio-politica~ ethics is that "there are no limits to be set in 
23Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Ethic of Jesus and the Social Problem, " 
Religion in Life, I, No.2 (Spring, 1932), po 200. 
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history for the achievement of more universal brotherhood, for the development 
. 24 ' 
of more perfect and more inclusive mutual relations. " In view of the fact 
• 
that there is this indeterminate .possibility, it seems that there must be some 
element which will continually pUJ:"ify the already existing love that exists be-
tween and among men 0 Thus, Niebuhr says that "the most direct relationship 
of love to the problems of the community would seem to be the purifying effect 
of sacrificial love upon mutual love. ,,2 5 liThe law of love, therefore, is not a 
norm of history in the sense that historical experience justifies it. Historical 
experience justifies more complex social strategies in which the self, individual 
and collective, seeks to preserve its life and to relate it harmoniously to other 
lives. ,,26 But Niebuhr is quick to point out that the strategies about which he 
is talking and the systems of justice which men propose cannot maintain them-
selves without this deeper dimension of the law of love. 27 
But, it is argued that the collective self need not conform to a standard 
higher than that of prudent self-interest. Yet, the very nature of the community 
as Niebuhr sees it, contradicts this contention. The conscience of the in-
dividuals within any given community must concern itself with the relation of 
24Niebuhr, Human Destiny, p. 85. 
2 5Niebuhr, Faith and History I p. 185. 
26Niebuhr, Human Destiny, p. 96. 
27Ibid • 
I 
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life within the community to -life outside of it. U it dbes not I the eommunity 
itself will be self-defe~ting. 28 
• 
Now we have seen that '!=he ideal of love is an impossibility on both 
the individual and collebtive levels 0 But, we have also seen that in spite of 
... -
its impossibility I the ideal of love has relevance for social ethics. The ideal 
is necessary because it is derived from the nature of man and the nature of 
man's communities. Earlier, we discussed the nature of sacrificial love and its 
relation to mutual love and saw the latter as the type of love which exists be-
tween and among men and is necessary for individual fulfillment. We noted 
that the reciprocal aspect 9annot be the object of any act of love because, if 
it were, the act would cease to be love. On this basis, we saw how sacrificial 
love and mutual love are related. All that was said in this regard applies to ~ 
the community situation as well as the individual. But, we must ask wh('th('r 
this constitutes the entire picture on the social level. 
Dro John C. Bennett thinks "that in Niebuhr's formal analysis of love 
there is a missing link as we seek to relate love to social ethics. ,,29 He feels 
that this missing link is presupposed in the whole of Niebuhr's thought but 
does not find it clearly relate'd to the types of love which Niebuhr empha"sizes. 
"Mutual love is the form of love that is closest to social ethics, but this con-
28Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of History, po 235. 
29Bennett, ..QE.. ciL I p. 570 
\ 
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cept does not describe the kind of love which is often present in' connectf.on with 
the larger problems of sO¢iety where the element of mutualit}'! is lacking." 30 
• 
Dr. Bennett sees this as a love that has agape in it, but is not pure agape. It 
consists in "a real caring' for the welfare and dignity of all of our neighbors, 
even those whom we never see, those who may live as vast multitudes on other 
continents or those who may actually be opponents or enemies. ,,31 This love 
means that we will justice for others and it expresses itself in many different 
forms. 
Thus far, our analysis has been dealing with the formal aspects of 
Niebuhr's social ethics. w.e are now in a position to begin to consider the re-
lation of the ideal of love in terms of material content. In other words I we ask 
how this law of love is to be applied to the concrete decisions that make up the 
everyday life of the community. 
Perhaps I the most simple and direct answer to the question that we have 
just placed is that the law of love is applied to social ethics by means of the 
laws of justice. This does not mean that Niebuhr's position has been altered. 
He still holds that "the final law in which all other law is fulfilled is the law 
of love. But this law does not abrogate the laws of justice except as love 
30Ibid • 
31Ibid., po 58. 
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rises above justice to exceed its demands. ,,32 This simply means that on the 
practical level, the' aff~irs of the community are to be governed' by the spirit of 
• justice which spells ou~ particular rights and duties. Love is not to be sub-
stituted for justice in Niebuhr's scheme. Rather, it is the fulfillment and 
... -
highest form of justice. 33 Justice is the highest rational ideal because reason 
must deal in terms of ascertainable causes and 'consequences of moral action. 
Yet, it must always be remembered that rational justice is related to the law of 
love both positively and negatively. The positive relation is that it contains 
approximations to the ideal of love. At the same time, there is a negative re-
lation because rational jus.tice constantly seeks to do something less than 
justice 0 34 
At this point, it will be advantageous to resume our discussion of 
Niebuhr's attack on Catholic natural law theory. On the formal level, Niebuhr's 
position is clear enough because of his position on the nature of man and his 
emphasis on the law of love. On the level of application, however, his posi-
tion can only be understood in terms of that against which he is primarily 
reacting. 
32Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Spirit of Justice," Christianity and Society, 
XV, No.3 (Summer, 1950), pp. 5-6. 
33Ibido 
34Niebuhr, Human Destiny, pp. 248-520 
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In the last chapter, we saw that Niebuhr criticized the upholders of the 
natural law theory for overemphasizing the human reason and for not admitting 
• 
that original sin had corrupted man1s rational capacity. His other major area 
of criticism arises out of what he considers to be undue confidence in human 
reason. This criticism centers around the natural law tendency to find universal 
propositions under shifting historical conditions and this leads to one of two 
errors. Natural law proponents either define the primordial or biological as 
normative as in the birth control issue where Niebuhr feels that "nature" is 
defined in purely biological terms or they confuse historically contingent stan-
dards with purely natural o.nes. 35 
Niebuhr does not feel that the material content of ethics can be drawn 
from its formal principle except perhaps in very general terms,. He does allow 
for universally valid moral propositions if they are minimal and state something 
as broad as that which prohibits murder. 36 But, natural law goes much further. 
He feels that "it gives the peculiar conditions and unique circumstances in 
.. which reason operates in a particular historical moment the sanctity of 
universality. ,,37 By way of illustration, he says that "the social ethics of 
35Reinhold Niebuhr, itA Protestant Looks at Catholics, ,; The 
Commonweal, LVIII, No.5 (May 8, 1953), pp. 117-120. 
36Ibid • 
37Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 281. 
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Thomas Aquinas embody,. the peculiarities and the contingent factors of a feudal-
, 
agrarian economy into a" system of fixed socio-ethical principles. ,,38 
• 
This does not m~an, however, that Niebuhr d~nies the necessity and 
" 
, 
validity of human reasorl in determ!ning the material content of social ethics. 
We have already seen that he insists upon it. What he objects to is the 
canonization of reason to the extent that it is thought that concrete ethical de-
cisions can be made without some defect in them. The place of reason in this' 
scheme has been stated by Niebuhr in the following words: 
Reason itself is not the source of law, since it is not possible to prove 
the selfls obligation to the neighbor by any rational analysis which does 
not assume the proposHion it intends to prove 0 Yet reason works helpfully 
to define the obli~ation of love in the complexities of various types of 
human rela tions. 9 , 
Repeatedly I Niebuhr has been charged with being a moral relativist by 
natural law proponents. Just as repeatedly, he has denied the charge and it 
seems that, in many respects, the charge is not one that is justified 0 For, it 
might even be said that he upholds a somewhat limited natural law •. We can 
let him defend himself in his own' words: 
Even if we do not accept the Catholic theory of a highly specific "natural 
law" we all do accept principles of justice which transcend the positive 
enactments of historic states and which are less speCific and not so 
38Ibid • 
39Niebuhr, Faith and History, p.193. 
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'i' 
sharp~ define~ as ppsitive law, and yet more specific than the law of 
love., ' 
, 
(. '> ; 
One analysis of Niebuhr"s ethics sets forth even finer distlnctions in the scale 
. ~... . 
of moral relativity. These are based on the overall view of Niebuhr's writings 
but are not explicitly spelled out in anyone place by Niebuhr himself. "A 
complete catalog would appear to include in descending order: the love ideal, 
absolute natural law, 'political principles,' positive or civil law, basic social 
structures and institutions, and finally the level of naked power conflicts. ,,41 
Thus, Niebuhr's attacks on the natural law theory seem to sharpen the 
focus on two elements of his own social ethics. The first element is the place 
of reason in working out the material content; the second is the emphasis he 
places on historical contingencies. Perhaps, i"t would be profitable to discuss 
the validity and accuracy of his criticisms of the natural law at this pOint, but I it seems better to move on to complete the study of his ethics of United States 
foreign policy since our aim is not evaluation of Niebuhr's position but simply 
an understanding of his foreign policy ethics 0 
In summary, then, we have seen that the social ethics of Niebuhr 
follows directly from his concept of the nature of man. Love remains the 
primary norm of all human activity. Man's existential condition is basically 
40Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 148. 
41 Reinhold Niebuhr, Reinhold Niebuhr Q!2 Politics, ed. Harry Ro Davis, 
and Robert C. Good (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), po 166, 
I (editors' footnote) • 1 
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insecure. From this condition arises a w111-to-power which, if properly used, 
,Will assist him in attaining the goal which is laid down for him in the law of 
• 
love. The resulting state, in tbis case, is one of justice which is the 
highest achievement of manls existential natureo Improper use of power results 
.. ,-
in injustice. The social ethics, therefore, is concerned with balancing power 
so as to effect the highest form of justice. It does this by using reason to 
apply the law of love to concrete everyday practical decisions. Yet, Niebuhr 
is always painfully aware that the deficiencies of human reason and the contin-
gent nature of history make it impossible to achieve perfection in these 
decisions. He is also insistent that it is much more difficult to achieve this 
justice when we operate on the collective level 0 At the same time he points 
out that the community is necessary for the achievement of justice. Now we 
can turn to investigat~ the application of his theory in the concrete cases of 
United States foreign policy. 
, 
" 
I 
1 
,CHAPTER IV 
.-
WAR 
.--
The study of Niebuhr's analysis of United States foreign policy could 
be undertaken in several different ways. We could approach it historically by 
taking up the various issues as he wrote about them. If our interest were the 
interest of an historian or political sCientist, this would probably be the most 
fruitful way of proceeding. We could also proceed by selecting those issues 
about which Niebuhr wrote the most. This would enable us to see the ethical 
issues t.i1at came up but there is still a danger that we would become mor~ in-
volved in the political aspects rather t;han the philosophical. Since our aim is 
a comprehensive view of the ethical aspects of United States foreign policy, it 
seems best to proceed by way of analyzing the two major ipeas or categories 
into which all of his foreign policy writing can be placed. Consequently, the 
present chapter will be devoted to the first of these categories which is war; 
the following chapter will take up the second which is peace ~ In this way I we 
can best keep our focus on the ethical aspects of his analysis. But, this does 
not mean that we intend to ignore the historical or political aspects. We will 
consider them at length but always with a view to the accomplishment of our 
primary prupose. 
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It might be said that Niebuhr's war theory has had tbree stages. In 
his early years he was an ardent supporter of the pacifist Position but this was 
• 
quickly changed and he became one of its most outspoken opponents. Once he 
\ ' 
recognized the validity and necessity of war, his position has not changed 
basically although it has undergone development and modification because of 
the new problems introduced by the advent of nuclear weapons. 
Niebuhr's break with pacifism began when he came to realize that 
there is no moral difference between violence and non-violence. He writes: 
The differences are pragmatic rather than intrinsic 0 The social conse-
quences of the two methods are different, but the differences are in degree 
rather than in kind. Both place restraint upon liberty and both may destroy 
life and property. Once the principle of coercion and resistance has been 
accepted as necessary to the social struggle and to social cohesion, and 
pure pacifism has thus been abandoned, the differences between violence 
and non-violence lose their absolute significance, though they remain 
important. 1 
The importance of the distinction to which Niebuhr refers at the end of the 
passage just quoted is that he regards social violence as a great evil which 
ought to be avoided if at all possible because of the potential destruction in-
volvedo 2 
In discussing Niebuhr's thought on the pacifist issue, Dr. John C. 
1 Reinhold Niebuhr, "ls Peace or Justice the Goal?" The World 
Tomorrow, )N, No. 10 (September 21, 1932), ppo 276-77 .. 
2Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, (New York: 
Harper and Bros., 1935), PP. 188-89. 
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Bennett points out that ~iebuhr' s mind changed "only as the iB:ctual alternatives 
in the world became 'Umi~ed to surrender to the expandIng totalitarianism on the 
• 
one hand and violent resistance ,by nations resulting in war on the other. 113 
Niebuhr criticized the pacifists beQ.ause they tried to apply the personal ethic 
, ! ~ 
ot sacrificial love to the~ social problem of war 0 The moral i'ssues of war re-
quire a different ethic because the issue is whether or not to accept suffering 
by others as the victims of injustice and aggression. 
Shortly before World War II, Niebuhr was largely instrumental in 
founding the magazine, Christianity and Crisis, which was intended to counter-
act the pacifist trend in the various religious sects. It is a very interesting and 
profitable study to trace his thought on this pacifist issue as it is unfolded in a 
large number of articles in this magazine. Although it is impossible to conside 
these articles in great detail, we can uncover the general aspects of his 
thought on the pacifist issue by means of a general study of them. 
In the very first issue, Niebuhr1s general viewpoint was stated. He 
insists that there are historic situations in which the refusal to defend the in-
heritance of a civilization, even though it is very imperfect, against aggression 
may result in unjust consequences much worse than war. 4 He then goes on 
to criticize the "perfectionists II on two pOints. They are wrong in their 
3Bennett,.QQ.. cito, p. 66. 
4Reinhold Niebuhr, liThe Christian Faith and the World Crisis, .. 
Christianity and Crisis, I, No.1 (February 10,1941), p. 4. 
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failure to distinguish between individual and social ethics which results in 
"tIleir desire to establish a political policy of submission to injustice with the 
• 
further result that the lives and interests of others are defrauded or destroyed. 
They are wrong also because they feel that there is no right or obligation to de-
,.,-
fend an imperfect political system. 5 
Later in the same year after the United States had placed economic 
sanctions on Japan, Niebuhr pOinted out that the sanctions would be useless 
unless the Japanese realized that the United States would go to war if 
necessary. If this were not the case, then all that the Japanese would have to 
do to eliminate the sanctioI').s would be to threaten a violent reaction. Thus, 
there is no possibility of drawing an absolute line between violent and non-
violent action. 6 
We have already seen a theme which Niebuhr constantly reiterates 
when he shows that the alternatives that we have are either gOing to war or 
succumbing to a Nazi victory. His conclusion, of course, is that the obliga-
tion to seek after the highest possible degree of justice demands that we choose 
the former alternative. But, he carries this even further when he sets up a 
pair of hypothetical cases and comments on their moral value. The first of 
5Ibid. 
6Reinhold Niebuhr I "Japan and Economic Sanctions I II Ch~istianity 
and Crisis, I, No o 15 (August 25,1941)' p. 2. 
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these is the case of tho"~e who say that it is better to choo~e enslavement 
without death and destnlction whel) the odds of success are, slight. The second 
-, 
is the case of those who say that at a time when the odds of succesS are 
minimal, it is still better to risk death and destruction in pursuit of a victory 
even though enslavement may result anyway. Niebuhr places such importance 
on the avoidance of enslavement and the resulting higher degree of justice that 
he says that the second of these alternatives would be the better moral decision 
even if the first would be a better decision from a strictly political or strategi-
cal point of view. 7 
Niebuhr's views on the morality of war become much more clear when 
viewed in the light of his comments on the Neutrality Act of 1939. He goes so 
far as to say that this "is one of the most immoral laws that was ever spread 
upon a federal statute book.,,8 Niebuhr feels that the immorality of this law was 
heightened because a great deal of misguided idealism was evoked in its 
support. The remainder of the article is devoted to the task of setting down 
some general notions on the differences between, morality and immorality. He 
describes the essence of immorality as "the evasion or denial of moral respon-
7Reinhold Niebuhr, "Reflections on the World Situation," Christianity 
and Crisis, I, No.6 (April 21, 1941), po 2. 
8Reinhold Niebuhr, "Repeal the Neutrality Act," Christianity and 
Crisis, I, No. 18 (October 20, 1941), p. 1. 
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i sibility 0,,9 The immorcH man, therefore, 1s one who "refuses to recognize his 
obligations as a memb~r of a community" and who "isolate~ himself from the' 
affairs of his community and acts as a completely unrela;ed individual. ,,10 
"Morality, II on the other hand, "consists in the recognition of interdependence 
, 
, 
of personal life 0 ,,11 A~ opposed to the immoral man, lithe moral man is the man 
'who acts responsibly in relation to his fellows', who knows the duties that 
communal life requires I and who is willing to accept the consequences which 
these duties impose. ,,12 Here, we see the application, in practical terms., of 
the concept of the nature of the human self and his relation to the community. 
This examination of Niebuhr's attacks on pacifism shows us that his 
practical views are both an embodiment and a clarification of his general ethi-
cal theory. We see, as we have just noted, his concept of the nature of man 
and the community 0 The distinction between individual and collective morality 
is clarified in terms of the obligations one has toward others when making 
decisions that affect the group. His insistence on the defense of less-than-
perfect political systems echoes' his comments on the existential nature of 
man and his communities which contain only approximations of the ideal of 
9Ibido 
10Ibid. 
11 Ibid . 
12Ibid. 
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love. The necessity of ¢hoosing between alternatives that a:re only relatively 
; 
perfect embodies his assertions regarding the relational character of justice • 
• 
Finally, the total picture is an example of the way in which reason operates in 
Niebuhr's system to apply the ethical ideal by means of achieving a balance of 
, .<, ... 
power. 
Another element is added to the war theory as we begin to consider the 
problem of the just war in the nuclear age. Here we see how Niebuhr adapts 
to the new problems presented as a result of the contingent nature of history. 
His theory on nuclear war develops only gradually and illustrates his aspect of 
Niebuhr's general ethical tl)eory as well as his approach to the new problems 
of social ethics. 
The problem first begins to present itself when the question of oblitera-
tion bombing comes up. In March, 1944, he writes in the editorial section of 
Christianity and Crisis that obliteration bombing would seem to exceed the 
limits of total war .13 Since he invites readers' comments on this issue, it 
would seem that at this time he did not have a definite opinion on the matter. 
A few weeks later, he wrote that the bombing question should remain under 
scrutiny because of the tendency of the military mind to ignore moral and 
political factors in determining strategy. He pOints out that the change of 
13Reinhold Niebuhr I "Editorial Notes I II Christianity and Crisis I IV I 
No.4 (March 20 I 1944) I p. 2 •. 
, 
l 
, 
policy from precision bombing to obliteration bomb~ng came about unexpectedly 
without an explanation of the reasons behind it. And, he goes on to suggest 
• 
that we are not employing all ~e moral and political forces at our disposal to 
, 
aid us in achieving victory.14 In the following issue, he again editorializes 
on the problem and says that it seems that a line can be drawn in terms of 
military necessity but that this necessity is extremely difficu..t to define. At 
the same time, he suggests that the lack of a satisfactory political reconstruc-
tion program increases the military necessity of physical destruction .15 
Over a year later, he takes up the atomic issue and offers two alterna-
tives as possible solutions; to the problem. The first of these would be to out-
law the bomb but he rules this out as impractical for several reasons. 
Historically, the outlawing of particular instruments of conflict has been un-
successful. Moreover , such a policy would only engender mistrust. Then 
there would also be the problem that it would be ·impossible to put the nations 
who have the bomb and those who do not on an equal footing. Finally, this 
system would only guarantee non~use at the beginning of any war. The other 
alternative is an international organization .and he does not find this wholly 
satisfactory either because the bipolar arrangement of nations would make the 
14Reinhold Niebuhr, "Is the Bombing Necessary? II Christianity and 
Crisis, IV, No.5 (April 3, 1944), pp. 1-2. 
15Reinhold Niebuhr "Editorial Notes," Christianity and Crisis, IV, 
No.6 (April 17 ,1944), p. 2. 
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organization virtually ineffective. Then he sets down a general norm which 
states that the policy should be so directed that it would overcome rather than 
... 
aggravate mutual fear and mis'trq,st .16 : 
Niebuhr finds it impossible to come to any easy or clear-cut solution 
.. --
to the nuclear problemo iHe fully recognizes the importance lof the problem be-
cause of the possibility of incalculable destruction. He insists that the notion 
that the excessive violence that would result from nuclear war has ended the 
possibility of a just war is unrealistic and that the moral problem is altered 
but not eliminated. He says that lithe development of atomic weapons has 
heightened the moral dilemmas which periodically generate the pacifist revolt 
against responsibilities which embody moral ambiguities. ,,17 But he will not 
. concede that it has solved them. 
He rej ects the pacifists who offer the solution which is urging the 
renunciation of atomic weapons because the solution they offer oversimplifies 
the problem 0 These pacifists would hope that the enemy would go along with a 
plan for renunciation but they are willing to do it alone if necessary. Of course 
Niebuhr is unhappy with this not only because we do not have access to the 
will of the enemy and therefore would not know whether they did go along with . 
16Reinhbld Niebuhr, "The Atomic Issue," Christianity and Crisis, 
V, No. 17 (October 15, 1945), pp. 5-7. 
17 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Hydrogen Bomb and Moral Responsibility, /I I 
The Messenger, XIX, No.9 (May 4, 1954), p. 50 
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it or not but also because a responsible state,man Qannot put h:!'$ nation in 
~ . 
such a position· of defenJelessness even if such a course of ;iaction is permitted 
, . 
,i , • ' 
to an individual and might even pe the more virtuous thing id the latter case .18 
Niebuhr rules out the possibility of mutual disarmament as a solution to 
.,;-
the problem because of the impossibility of devising adequate inspection 
systems and the exceptional risk involved in such an undertaking. He writes: 
For nuclear disarmament, even if undertaken mutually I involvs some risk 
to the securities of both sides 0 There is small prospect that either side 
would be willing to take the risks. This remains true even if their failure 
to do so would involve the world in the continued peril of nuclear warfare .19 
Here the proposed solution is ruled out both on the practical and moral levels. 
• ", .:j " 
Niebuhr also considers the proposal. that there can be limited wars in 
the nuclear age even with the use of nuclear weapons 0 Although time seems to 
be answering the difficulty raised in his obj ection, it should be noted that he 
raised the doubt that tactical atomic weapons could be useful instruments in 
such limited wars 0 20 
Niebuhr's solution to the nuclear problem does not seem to appear. He 
is unwilling to admit that all war in the nuclear age should be outlawed because 
18Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Hydrogen Bomb," Christianity and Society I 
'iN I No.2 (Spring, 1950) I pp. 5-7. 
19Reinhold Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires, (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), p. 269. 
20Ibid., p. 280. 
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of the horrible consequences that might result. He cannot see the practical 
possibility of preventin~ war by means of disarmament • Nor does he see that 
• 
the possibility of limited wars is a practical solution. He would encourage 
more positive effort to avoid all sy-ph wars and remains open to the new develop-
ments of science and political and military strategy before coming to an 
ultimate solution. 
There is still another aspect of Niebuhr's war theory which has been 
implicit in the foregoing but demands clarification and emphasis here. Although 
he is insistent upon the moral necessity and validity of war for the purpose of 
the attainment of the highe.st possible justice, he is at the same time insistent 
that war must not be extended beyond that pOint which is necessary for the 
attainment of this goalo A case in pOint is the controversy between President 
Truman and General MacArthur during the Korean War. Niebuhr felt that 
President Truman's action in removing MacArthur when the latter wanted to ex-
tend the war was not only justified but also the only morally 'correct alternative 
even if MacArthur's plan might have been better politically and militarily. But 
Niebuhr even felt that President Truman's decision had good effects politically 
as is indicate4 when he wrote that "the dismissal of MacArthur without 'a 
serious political crisis not only reassured our European friends about the sanity 
of our foreign policy but also about the stability of our democratic institu-
. 
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tions ... 21 
In summary, "then, we have seen that Niebuhr's general ethical theory 
readily finds application as well as clarification in his evaluation of the 
various aspects of war. This war""1:Peory comprises a substantial port i' " 
foreign policy ethics. His aim is to show how the balance of power is designed 
to produce the highest form of justice which is the existential embodiment of 
the ideal of love. The balance notion is brought out best if we contrast his 
efforts to combat pacifism with his comments on the virtues of limiting the war 
in Korea. He also wants to make clear that there is a sharp distinction between 
individual and collective morality. This distinction was not quite so pro-
nounced when we were dealing on the theoretical level, but it becomes more 
apparent as we consider the practical aspects of Niebuhr's ethics. Finally, 
we have seen the place of reason and historical contingencies and the role that 
they play in the working out of the concrete practical decisions of social 
ethics. Now that we have considered the major aspects of Niebuhr's views on" 
war, we can turn to the question" of peace to round out our view of Niebuhr's 
foreign policy ethics. 
21 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Peril of War and the Prospects of Peace, " 
Christianity and Crisis, XI, No. 17 (October 15,1951), p. 129. 
l 
CHAPTER V 
• 
PEACE 
From what we have already seen of Niebuhr's concept of collective 
morality, we are not surprised that he is continually calling our attention to 
the fact that moral problems become more serious and more complex as the com-
munity becomes larger. As a result, he views the moral issues in international 
relations as much more difficult than any others in the entire political realm. 
It is no wonder, then, that.he was quite critical of Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles for what Niebuhr viewed as an oversimplified approach to the 
moral problems of international affairs 0 The views of Mr. Dulles on the Com-
munists are a case in point. Niebuhr's criticism can be summed up in his own 
words as follows: "Mr 0 Dulles' moral universe made everything quite clear, 
too clear, with the result that it complicated our relations with our allies, who 
found our self-righteousness very vexatious 0 III This same criticism about an 
oversimplified approach to the moral problems of international affairs was also 
a consistent theme in his writings on the Suez crisis in 195·6. 
1Reinhold Niebuhr, liThe Moral World of Foster Dulles, " The New 
Republic, CXXXIX, No.2 (December I, 1958), p. 8. 
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At the base of theiproblem of the ethios of foreign policy is the question 
about the extent to whicn'the policy should be governed by self-concern on the 
• 
one hand and altruism on the other. Niebuhr tells us that it is not easy for a 
nation to be concerned with other nations in altruistic terms ,,i He cautions that 
"a nation that is too preoccupied with its own interests is bound to define those 
interests too narrowly • • • because it will fail to consider those of its 
interests' which are bound .!ill. in .2.. web of mutual interests with other nations 0 ,,2 
Niebuhr suggests two things in connection with this problem. First, he does 
not ask that any nation abandon self-concern altogether but insists that nations 
must realize that what is good for the alliance of free nations is for the ultimate 
good of any individual nation also. But this is not enough. Thus, the second 
requirement is that the citizens of a nation must have loyalties and responsi-
bilities to a wider system of values than the national interest. 3 
The possession of great power carries with it the responsibility of 
using that power to effect the greatest degree of social justice. Niebuhr, 
therefore, is constantly insisting that the United States I because of its position 
of power, must employ every means to use its power in a responsible manner. 
He indicates that there are two ways in which we can deny our responsibilities 
to our fellow men. The first is by way of imperialism wherein we seek to 
2Reinhold Niebuhr, IIOur Moral and Spiritual Resources for International 
Cooperation," Social Action, XXII, No.2 (February, 1956), p. 180 
3Ibido, ppo 18-19,0 
, 
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1 
dominate them by our po~er. The second is by way of isolationism wherein Wi:; 
attempt to withdraw from our responsibilities toward them. 4 . He points out' 
) , . : 
that the isolationist tendencies 9f the United States stem from the fact that 
until just recently she was far removed physically from the rest of the world 
, .. -
with the result that she did not feel her responsibility" But, he insists that 
the United States must realize its obligation toward the rest of the world and 
therefore manipulate its power for the good of mankind. 5 
We can see what Niebuhr is talking about here by considering its em-
bodiment in actual foreign policy instruments and situations. The duty of 
helping other nations whic!} are enslaved was the subject of an article in 
Christianity and Crisis in 1943 wherein Niebuhr urged both material help and 
the defeat of the tyranny which was holding them in slavery. He said that 
there is a duty to love without looking for a return. 6 He had written in a 
similar way the year before and had also included another aspect when he said 
that we must be mindful of the positive aspect of the reconstruction of a world 
order in addition to the negative aspect of defeating the enemy. 7 Other aspects 
4Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History, (New York: 
Charles Scribner'.s Sons, 1952), po 36. 
5Reinhold Niebuhr, "American Power and World Responsibility, " 
Christianity and Crisis, III, Noo 5 (AprilS, 1943), po 40 
6Reinhold Niebuhr, "America and the Enslaved Nations," Christiunity 
and Crisis, I, No o 17 (October 6, 1941), pp. 1-20 
7 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Our Responsibilities in 1942," Christianity and 
GU!31.§,I, No. 24 (January 12, 1942), pp. 1-2. 
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of his theory regarding American responsibility appeared about the same time. 
These include such fundamental notions as the abandonment of the principle of 
• 
unlimited national sover~ignty, economic reconstruction, ,and the placing of 
limitations on victors as well as on_ the vanquished. 8 
The fact that Niebuhr praised the Marshall Plan to such an extent that 
he called it "a kind of turning pOint in postwar history,,9 prompts us to consider 
this plan in some detail 0 In order to do this, it will be necessary to consider 
the details of this plan in the context of the larger program of American foreign 
policy of which it was the most significant part. 
During the period fr?m 1946 until 1950, United States foreign policy 
developed in four major steps: the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the 
North Atlantic Treaty (NATO), and the Point Pour Program. These were programs 
which worked out the details of a general concept which formed the basis of 
American policy. The general orientation of the program consisted in the ac-
ceptance of the concept of bipolarity. The United States policy was that of 
containment which was spelled out in detail in an article in Foreign Affairs in 
8Reinhold Niebuhr, "Allied Peace Claims, " Christianity and Crisis, 
I, No. 11 (June 30, 1941), p. 2. 
9Reinhold Niebuhr, IIEditorial Notes," Christianity and Crisis « VII, 
No. 14 (August 4, 1947), p. 2. 
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1947. 10 This was a poU6y in which the United States committed itself to con-, 
taining Soviet power' by cZounterforce at a number of shifting geographical and 
:. i 
• 
political points which would be determined according to the shifts in Soviet 
policy. The result would be frustration which would work at the weaknesses 
,,- ' 
in the Soviet system. 
In 1947 t a civil war was being carried on in Greece in which the 
Communists were trying to overthrow the popularly elected government that was 
being sustained economically by Great Britain. At the same time, the Soviets 
were attempting to gain a free hand in the Turkish Straits 0 The Turks, too t 
were receiving economic a~d military assistance from the British. Early in that 
same year I Great Britain advised the United States that she would discontinue 
aid after three months. President Truman decided that the United States should 
take over the role of Great Britain in order to show its interest in the policy of 
containment. This was to be done primarily by economic assistance. The 
policy came to be known as the Truman Doctrine 0 . 
In June, 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall proposed a scheme 
which was later to become known as the Marshall Plan. His proposal sug-
gested that the countries of Europe plan their economic recovery in common. 
He assured them that those countries who were willing to cooperate would 
10 By X, liThe Sources of Soviet Conduct, " Foreign Affairs, )ON, 
(July I 1947), pp. 566-82. (It was later disclosed that the author of this 
article was George F. Kennan.) , 
\ 
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r~ceive help and encouragement from the United States. Thf# pu,rpose of the 
plan was to provide political assistance to the countries that wanted it for the 
~ . 
• 
purpose of fighting against hung,er and poverty so that conditions might be 
created wherein free institutions could exist 0 Thus, the Marshall Plan went 
beyond the Truman Doctrine in that it was offering political assistance and not 
merely economic aid. 
At the end of August, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was 
formed for the purpose of maintaining and developing the individual and 
collective capacity of the signing nations to resist armed attack. It was 
agreed that all the member .nations would look upon an armed attack against one 
as an attack against all. The prime NATO principle was that military establish-
ments should be rebuilt in order to defend the reconstructed economies 0 Now I 
United States aid had been extended to include economic, political and 
military assistance. 
When President Truman was inaugurated in 1949, the Point Pour pro-
posal was explicated in his inaugural address. He stated that the lines of 
United States foreign policy were to support the United Nations', to give 
economic assistance to strengthen the free world, to provide military assistance 
for the same purpose, and finally to inaugurate a program for the development of 
the underdeveloped countries. The motivation behind this proposal was two-
fold 0 It was looked upon as an humanitarian program but was also designed , 
70 
to bring a larger number of countries into the sphere of influence of the United 
States .11 
.. 
Niebuhr's enthus~asm about the .Matshall Plan is not surprising when 
we consider that in 1943 he wrote as follows concerning the role of America 
. -
after the war: "America could function in the interest of democracy only if it 
were ready to give economic support to the continent without seeking to pre-
vent the establishment of systems which sought to combine collective forms of 
economy with political freedom. ,,12 His comments on the motivation that 
prompted the plan bring into focus the tension between self-concern and 
altruism about which we SP9ke earlier 0 Here we have the concrete embodiment 
of what we considered before in more theoretical terms. He remarks that both 
~ the national interest and the needs of others were served by this effort of the 
United States. In his own words: "In it prudent self-interest was united with 
concern for others in a fashiOn which represents the most attainable virtue of 
nations. ,,13 The Marshall Plan, for Niebuhr, was especially significant be-
11This summary of foreign policy from 1946 to 1950 is based on: 
William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, United 
States Foreign Policy 1945-1955, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Insti-
tution, 1956), pp. 104-40. 
~ 12Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Peril of Our Foreign Policy I" Christianity 
. a~d SOCiety, VIII, No.2 (Spring, 1943), p. 200 
13Reinhold Niebuhr, "Hybris, II Christianity and Society I XVI, No 0 2, 
(Spring, 1951), p. 4. • ! 
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cause it furthered the policy begun with the Truman Doctrine and achieved what 
the Truman Doctrine' could not achieve by itself .14 . 
• 
As for the North Atlantic ,Treaty, Niebuhr was almost as pleased. He 
looked upon it as the logical caps,~9ne of the policy which had been developing 
during the period from 1946 to 1950. It was an indication of the willingness of 
the United States to assume its responsibility toward the world community and 
a recognition of the responsibility that it had for leadership among the free 
nations of the Westo As a part of the overall policy of containment, it was the 
other side of the strategy which was at the base of the Marshall Plan .15 
We might legitimately ask why Nuebuhr was so much in favor of the 
United States I policies during this period when in each of the instances men-
tioned above she acted independently of the United Nations. A complete 
answer will be implicit in the examination of his views on world organization 
which we will take up later. But the answer can be given in somewhat general 
terms at this point. Basically, the reason would be found in his article, "The 
Myth of World Government, ,,16 where he points out that the constitutional 
setup of a state does not create a community. Rather the community itself 
14Reinhold Niebuhr, "Editorial Notes, II Christianity and Crisis, 
VII, No. 13 (July 21, 1947), p. 2. 
lSReinhold Niebuhr, "The North Atlantic Pact," Christianity and 
Crisis, IX, No.9 (May 30, 1949), pp. 65-66. 
16ReinhQld Niebuhr, "The Myth of World Government, " The Nation, . \ 
CLXII, No. 11 (March 16, 1946), pp. 312-14 • 
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must first exist and then the constitution can perfect it and give it more 
stability. The policies o~ this period were of such a nature that they were 
• 
able to create a type of community on the international level. As the sense of 
community developed, new constitut.ional developments appeared. In this 
.' . 
light; these policies would not be such as to be destructive of the United 
Nations but would ultimately foster its growth an'd stability. 
Before we proceed to take up the question of world organization, it 
will be profitable to pause briefly for purposes of orientation. In general, it 
might be said that there are three themes which permeate Niebuhr's writings 
concerning United States foreign policy and its relation toward peace during 
the war and post-war years. The first of these is the responsibility of the 
United States to assume leadership in the world community. The second has to 
do with the necessity of international cooperation. The third and final theme 
handles the question of international organization. 
We have already seen what Niebuhr means when he speaks of the 
responsibility of the United States to assume leadership in the world community 
This became clear both in the discussion on power and responsibility and in 
his comments on the specific aspects of the policy of containment which 
dominated the scene during the early post-war years 0 This was a theme that 
was occupying his time even before the United States entered World War II. In 
an article in Christianity and Crisis, he stated that it was impossible to 
'. 
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determine exactly what course would be followed after: the war but he was 
~ertain that the problem~ would be solved only if the llTnited'States would be 
, 
• 
willing to assume some measure, of responsibility for the world order. I7 This 
responsibility will be seen in a dif.~erent light as we take up the question of 
international organization. 
The second theme has also made up a part of the topics which we have 
been considering. During the years of World War II, Niebuhr was constantly 
stressing the importance of international cooperation. His satisfaction with 
the United States foreign policy program in the post-war years can be partially 
attributed to the fact that it fostered cooperation among nations. As we take up 
the consideration of international organization we will see that cooperation on 
various levels is a necessary prerequisite of any world g~vernment. 
If we consider the nature of man as found in Niebuhr, his concept of 
the interrelatedness of men, and the notions of his social ethics which call for 
the balancing of power and interests, we can logically proj ect that world 
government is a longed-for ideal ~ But, as Niebuhr himself points out, the 
problem of world government can be approached from two different, but not 
necessarily opposite, viewpoints. One is the viewpoint of historical realism; 
the other is that of rationplist idealism. Niebuhr says that the task of world 
organization should be approached from the standpoint of historical realism but 
17 Reinhold Niebuhr I liThe World After the War, II Christianity and 
Crisis l I, No.1 (February 10, 1941), p. 3. 
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then qualifies this statement by pointing to the contributions that can be made 
by idealism 0 18 
• 
In general, Niebuhr regards the utopian ideal of world government as a 
fallacy. This does hot mean that he is opposed to it or does not hold it up as 
an eventual ideal. He simply insists that "we do not have one world, or any 
hope of achieving it in the proximate future 0,,19 . The fallacy, he tells us, can 
be set down in two propositions. First, governments are not created by fiat. 
Second f governments have only limited efficacy in integrating a community. 20 
The proposition that governments are created by fiat which consists of 
legal and constitutional enactments is unrealistic because it fails to take into 
account the lessons of history. 21 An historical example of this attempt is the 
social contract concept which has been present in politic~l thought since the 
time of Hobbes. 22 Niebuhr admits that it is true that the United States was es-
tablished by the fiat of the social contract, but hastens to point out that the 
18Reinhold Niebuhr, "Plans for World Reorganization," Christianity and 
Crisis, II, No. 17 (October 19,1942), pp. 3-60 
19Reinhold Niebuhr, "One World or None," Christianity and Crisis, 
VIII, No.2 (February 16, 1948), po 9. 
2 o Niebuhr , Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 17. 
21Niebuhr, "The Myth of World Government, " QQ.. cit., p. 312. 
22Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 18. 
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community which made up the United States preceded the constitutional fiat. 
This community was established by such integrating factors as the fear of a 
• 
common enemy, the shared experience of the battlefield, a similar culture, and 
so forth. Thus, the Constitution es_tablished "a more perfect union" where 
union already existed. 2 3 
The second proposition shows a misconception of the relationship of 
government to community 0 "Governments cannot create communities for the 
simple reason that the authority of government is not primarily the authority 
of law nor the authority of force, but the authority of the community Itself. ,,24 
The real relation of government and community has been described by Niebuhr 
as follows: 
The fact is that governments presuppose community and in turn perfect 
it; but they cannot create it. Communities are created by more organic. 
processes than the fiat of a constitution. They rest upon mutual trust and 
other forces of cohesion such asa common language and culture, common 
traditions and common concepts of law and morals. The international com-
munity lacks all these forms of cohesion. 25 
Thus, the international community demands certain organic forces of cohesion. 
Primary among these are forces which Niebuhr calls "social tissue 0 " 
23Niebuhr, "The Myth of World Government,".Ql2.. cito, p. 313. 
24Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, po 220 
25Reinhold Niebuhr, "World Community and World Government, " 
Christia~ityand Crisis, VI, Noo 3 (March 4, 194a, p.5.' 
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Niebuhr sees that there is a degree of social tissue in the international 
community but it is minimal in comparison with that of existing national states • 
• 
National communities have a common ethnic background I language I geography I 
and history but these elements are not present in the international community .26 
In fact, there is little to create the consciousness of "we" with the possible 
exception of three factors which Niebuhr enumerates. The first is the in-
creasing economic interdependence of the people of the world but this should 
be contrasted with the wide disparity in the economic strength of various 
nations. 27 The second factor is the fear of mutual destruction but Niebuhr 
pOints out that "there is no record in history of peoples establishing a common 
community because they feared each other I though there are many instances 
where the fear of a common foe acted as the cement of cohesion. ,,28 Finally, 
the most important factor is the moral sense of ob1i~ation that men of all 
nations have toward their fellow men who live beyond the limits of their 
national states. 29 
Niebuhr feels that the United States is generally guilty of approaching 
2 6Niebuhr I "The Myth of World Government, " .QJ2.. cit ... , p. 313. 
27Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, po 27. 
28Ibid., p. 28. Cf. also: "The Myth of World Government, " ..9..2.. cH., 
p. 313 0 Here Niebuhr gives the present bipolar setup of nations as an example 
of the fear of a common enemy acting as a force of cohesion. 
29 Ibid • 
I 
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the question of international organization from an ideaUstic viewpoint rather 
then that of historical realism. He writes: 
. -
• 
What makes American proposals for ideal constitutional solutions particu-
larly vexatious is that we present them to the world even while we prove in 
our day-to-day politlC5 that ~e are only beginners in the lessons of in-
ternational mutuality. We are for world government until it is decided that 
its headquarters are :to be near our ancestral home. We ,:are for world 
government, but we think the British loan a~reement is too generous, 
proving thereby how little we understand the problems of a very wealthy 
nation I s relation to an impoverished world. 30 
And elsewhere, he says that "it would be intolerable if we again presented the 
world with a case of American schizophrenia, allowing our idealists to dream 
i 
up pure answers for different problems while our cynics make our name odious 
by the irresponsible exercise of our power ... 31 
In spite of the sharp criticisms of the American proposals which we have 
just seen, Niebuhr does see the United States in an important position in rela-
tion to the growth of the international community. There is, Niebuhr feels, 
another organiC factor (over and above the forms of social tissue described 
above) that is serving to integrate the free world. This is the power and 
authority of the United States as she has emerged as a leader among nations 
because of her Willingness to accept the responsibility thrust upon her as a 
result of a number of historical accidents. She has done this through a foreign 
30Niebuhr, "World Community and World Government,".Q.£. cit., 
po 6. 
31Niebuhr, "The Myth of World Government,".Q.£. cit., p. 314. 
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policy such as we saw sl1-e adopted during the post-war years. But he pOints 
out that this position of power is both valuable, for the unity of the world while 
• 
at the same time being dangerom) to justice. 32 
Here I we have seen Niebuhr's theory of the nature of- man and com-
... -
munity as it is developed in terms of practical political decisions 0 These de-
cisions are not such that they should be able, in themselves, to provide 
answers for the problems that will arise in the future. This would be contrary 
to Niebuhr's fundamental concepts of social ethics which places heavy emphasis 
on the contingencies of history. As for the more general norms which can be 
found in Niebuhr's social ethics I it can be safely said that they could be of 
value for future generations. But, it would seem that Niebuhr would feel that 
the aim of his writings on the ethics of specific political issues has been ac-
complished if subsequent generations would see a method for applying a 
general concept of the nature of man and community to the unique problems of 
the time in which they occur. 
32Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of History, pp. 206-7. .. 
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